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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over these consolidated cases pursuant to section 78-2-
2(3)(j) of the Utah Code. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW. AND 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the district courts properly dismissed claims brought by Mr. Estes 
against the named district court judges on the basis that he failed to comply with the 
notice-of-claim provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
63-30-11,-12. 
This issue is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State 
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Citv of St. George v. Turner. 860 P.2d 929, 932 
(Utah 1993). 
This issue has been preserved for appellate review at Tibbs R. 36-37, 146-
47, and 179-80;' Rigtrup R. 35-36, 153-54, and 173-74;2 SawayaR. 26-28,154-55, and 
185-86.3 
2. Whether the district courts properly dismissed claims brought by Mr. Estes 
against the named district court judges on the basis that those claims were barred by 
applicable statutes of limitation. 
1
 The record in Estes v. Tibbs. Dist. Ct. No. 960601239 (6th Dist. Ct), is referred 
to herein as "Tibbs R." 
2
 The record in Estes v. Rigtrup. Dist. Ct. No. 960905255 CV (3rd Dist. Ct), is 
referred to herein as "Rigtrup R." 
3
 The record in Estes v. Sawava. Dist. Ct. No. 96090955 CV (3rd Dist. Ct), is 
referred to herein as "Sawaya R." 
1 
This issue is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See 
Gramlich v. Munsey. 838 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Utah 1992): see also State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932, 936 (Utah 1994); City of St George v. Turner. 860 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah 1993). 
This issue has been preserved for appellate review at Tibbs R. 37-38, 146-
47, and 180; Rigtrup R. 36-37, 154, and 173-74; SawayaR. 28-29, 155, and 185-86. 
3. Whether the district courts properly dismissed claims brought by Mr. Estes 
on the grounds that those claims were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
This issue is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State 
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); City of St. George v. Turner. 860 P.2d 929, 932 
(Utah 1993). 
This issue has been preserved for appellate review at Rigtrup R. 37-39, 
155-56, and 173-74; SawayaR. 29-31, 154-58, and 185-86.4 
4. Whether the district courts properly ruled that Mr. Estes' failed to state a 
claim for relief under section 78-35-1 of the Utah Code because the conduct of the district 
court judges, as alleged in the complaint, was not "wrongful[] or willful[]" as a matter of 
law. 
This issue is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. See State 
v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Citv of St. George v. Turner. 860 P.2d 929, 932 
(Utah 1993). 
This issue has been preserved for appellate review at Rigtrup R. 39-42, 
4
 The district court in the Tibbs case rejected the Judge's argument that Mr. 
Estes' claim was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel and, consequently, this is 
not an issue in that case. 
2 
156-57, and 173-74; SawayaR. 31-33, 154-58, and 185-86.5 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-35-1: 
Any judge, whether acting individually or as a member of a 
court, who wrongfully and willfully refuses to allow a writ of 
habeas corpus whenever proper application for the same has been 
made shall forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding $5,000 to the party 
thereby aggrieved. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11 : 
(1) A claim arises when the statute of limitations that would 
apply if the claim were against a private person begins to run. 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury against a governmental 
entity, or against an employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority shall file a written notice 
of claim with the entity before maintaining an action, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is characterized 
as governmental. 
(3) (a) The notice of claim shall set forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the claiming so far as they 
are known. 
(b) The notice of claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making the claim or that person's 
agent, attorney, parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to the responsible 
governmental entity according to the requirement of 
Section 63-30-12 or 63-30-13. 
(4) (a) If the claimant is under the age of majority, or 
mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian 
at the time the claim arises, the claimant may apply 
to the court to extend the time for service of notice 
of claim. 
5
 The district court in the Tibbs case rejected the Judge's argument that Mr. Estes 
had failed to state a claim under section 78-35-1 and, consequently, this is not an issue in 
that case. 
3 
(b) (i) After hearing and notice to the governmental entity, 
the court may extend the time for service of notice of claim. 
(ii) The court may not grant an extension that exceeds 
the applicable statute of limitations. 
(c) In determining whether or not to grant an extension, 
the court shall consider whether the delay in serving the 
notice of claim will substantially prejudice the 
governmental entity in maintaining its defense on the 
merits. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3(1): 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all 
governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which 
results from the exercise of a governmental function, 
governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or other 
governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program 
conducted in either public or private facilities. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5): 
"Injury" means death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of 
property, or any other injury that a person may suffer to his person, 
or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a private person or 
his agent. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-29: 
An action may be brought within one year: 
(1) for liability created by the statutes of a foreign state; 
(2) upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture where the 
action is given to an individual, or to an individual and the state, 
except when the statute imposing it prescribes a different 
limitation; 
(3) upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a criminal 
action, for a forfeiture or penalty to the state; 
(4) for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or 
seduction; 
(5) against a sheriff or other officer for the escape of a 
prisoner arrested or imprisoned upon either civil or criminal 
process; 
(6) against a municipal corporation for damages or injuries 
to property caused by a mob or riot; 
(7) on a claim for relief or a cause of action under the 
following sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent 
4 
Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific 
situations limits the time for action to four years, under 
Section 25-6-10; or 
(b) Subsection 25-6-6(2). 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25: 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded 
upon an instrument in writing; also on an open account for goods, 
wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store 
account; also on an open account for work, labor or services 
rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the 
foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within four years 
after the last charge is made or the last payment is received; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following 
sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific 
situations limits the time for action to one year, under 
Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(l)(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
Relevant portions of any other statute or rule are set forth in the body of the brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
These consolidated cases stem from the dismissal of three "petitions"6 filed by 
Mr. Estes, acting pro se, against three district court judges. [Tibbs R. 1-3; Rigtrup R. 1-3; 
Sawaya R. 1-2]. Although the factual basis for each complaint is slightly different, all 
were filed pursuant to section 78-35-1 of the Utah Code, contending that the named 
defendants "wrongfully and willfully refiise[d] to allow a writ of habeas corpus when[] 
6
 Although the pleadings were styled "Petition for Recovery of Monetary 
Penalty," they have at all times been treated as complaints, filed in accordance with Rules 
3 and 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5 
proper application for the same" had been made by Mr. Estes. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-
35-1.7 
The complaint against Judge Tibbs stems from the following facts, which Mr. 
Estes has alleged violate section 78-35-1: (i) Judge Tibbs dismissed a habeas petition 
filed by Mr. Estes8 on the sole ground he had named as the defendant the warden of the 
Central Utah Correctional Facility who was not alleged to have deprived Mr. Estes of any 
constitutional right, but whose only connection to Mr. Estes was the fact that he was 
warden of the prison where Mr. Estes was housed;9 (ii) Following remand of that case, 
Mr. Estes amended his writ to join the Utah Board of Pardons, but when he attempted to 
file it, the court informed him that the Sixth Circuit Court, where he originally filed the 
writ, no longer existed; and (iii) When Mr. Estes was finally able to locate the proper 
court to file the amended writ, the court refused to accept it without a filing fee or writ of 
impecuniosity, even though it was an amendment to his original writ, and even though 
Utah law prohibits charging a filing fee. [Tibbs R. 1-3]. 
7
 Section 78-35-1 provides, 
Any judge, whether acting individually or as a member of a court, who 
wrongfully and willfully refuses to allow a writ of habeas corpus whenever 
proper application for the same has been made shall forfeit and pay a sum 
not exceeding $5,000 to the party thereby aggrieved. 
8
 Mr. Estes' petition challenged the constitutionality of conduct by the Board of 
Pardons following this Court's decision in Foote v. Board of Pardons. 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 
1991). 
9
 Mr. Estes subsequently appealed Judge Tibbs' ruling. The Utah Court of 
Appeals affirmed on a different basis. That court held the Board of Pardons, in addition 
to the warden, should have been named defendants. Estes v. Van Per Veur, 824 P.2d 
1200, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
6 
The complaint against Judge Rigtrup stems from the following facts, which Mr. 
Estes has alleged violate section 78-35-1: On or about April 5, 1990, Judge Rigtrup 
denied a writ of habeas corpus filed by Mr. Estes10 on the grounds that the issues it raised 
(i) were identical to issues previously raised by Mr. Estes on the appeal of his conviction, 
or were raised and decided on appeal, and (ii) Mr. Estes had failed to allege "unusual 
circumstances" justifying an exception to the general rule that a petitioner may not raise 
issues in postconviction proceedings that could and should have been raised on direct 
appeal. [Rigtrup R. 44-45].n During the hearing on the motion to dismiss his writ, Judge 
Rigtrup stated "[t]his Court cannot correct another district judge, or second guess him, 
because of his judgement exercised in sentencing." [Rigtrup. R. 1-2]. Mr. Estes also 
offered the Court evidence of "unusual circumstances" justifying an exception to the 
general rule regarding issues that may be raised in postconviction proceedings. [Rigtrup 
R. 2]. In his complaint, Mr. Estes alleges Judge Rigtrup's conduct amounts to a 
wrongful and willful refusal to issue a writ of habeas corpus. [Rigtrup R. 1-2]. 
The complaint against Judge Sawaya stems from the following facts, which Mr. 
Estes has alleged violate section 78-35-1: Following Judge Rigtrup's dismissal of Mr. 
Estes' writ, he filed a habeas petition in the Third District Court, which was assigned to 
Judge Sawaya. [Sawaya R. 1]. In this petition, Mr. Estes sought to raise a claim for 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The ineffectiveness claim was based upon 
10
 Mr. Estes originally filed his writ in this Court, and the Court referred it to the 
Third District Court. 
11
 Mr. Estes appealed Judge Rigtrup's decision to this Court, and the Court 
denied Mr. Estes' petition. [Rigtrup R. 45]. 
7 
appellate counsel's refusal to raise a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
[Sawaya R. 47]. The State moved to dismiss the petition.12 Relying on Rule 4-501 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Judge Sawaya dismissed the petition on the 
grounds that Mr. Estes had failed to demonstrate why this issue had not been previously 
raised in the habeas petition that had been dismissed by Judge Rigtrup. [Sawaya R. 47-
48].13 Rule 4-501, however, expressly states that it "does not apply to petitions for habeas 
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. Utah Code Jud. Admin. Rule 4-501, 
Applicability. Mr. Estes' complaint alleges that Judge Sawaya's reliance on Rule 4-501 
as a basis for dismissing his habeas petition amounts to a wrongful and willful refusal to 
issue a writ of habeas corpus. [Sawaya R. 1-2]. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
On July 26, 1996, Mr. Estes filed his complaint against Judge Tibbs in the Sixth 
Judicial District Court in and for Sanpete County, State of Utah. [Tibbs R. 1-2]. On or 
about November 7, 1996, the Judge filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) and (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure along with a supporting 
memorandum of points and authorities. [Tibbs R. 33-143].14 The Judge's motion was 
12
 Although it is not clear from the record, it appears that Mr. Estes was not given 
an opportunity to respond to the State's motion to dismiss. 
13
 Mr. Estes appealed Judge Sawaya's dismissal and, on October 18, 1991, the 
Utah Court of Appeals, in an unpublished, per curiam opinion, affirmed Judge Sawaya's 
ruling. [Sawaya R. 49-51]. The court of appeals, however, did not consider the Rule 4-
501 issue. [LI] 
14
 Although counsel for the Judge ostensibly brought the motion under Rule 
12(b)(6) and (1), counsel submitted to the district court two affidavits and a number of 
unverified documents in support of the motion. Thus, the motion should have been 
8 
briefed and, following oral argument, the district court dismissed Mr. Estes complaint on 
the grounds that his claim (i) was barred because he failed to comply with notice 
provisions of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11, -12; and 
(ii) was barred by the statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-25, -29. [Tibbs R. 
179-80]. The district court did not mention, and therefore implicitly rejected, the Judge's 
arguments that Mr. Estes' claim was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and that 
the conduct Mr. Estes alleged did not amount to a violation of section 78-35-1 as a matter 
of law. On March 17, 1997, Mr. Estes filed a Notice of Appeal. [Tibbs R. 179]. 
On July 29, 1996, Mr. Estes filed his complaint against Judge Rigtrup in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County. [Rigtrup R. 1-3]. On or about 
November 6, 1996, the Judge filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) and (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure along with a supporting 
memorandum of points and authorities. [Sawaya R. 29-149].15 This memorandum raised 
the exact same issues as the motion filed in the Tibbs case. Following briefing and oral 
argument, the district court dismissed Mr. Estes complaint on the grounds that his claim 
(i) failed to comply with notice provisions of Utah's Governmental Immunity Act; (ii) 
was barred by the statute of limitations; (iii) was barred by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel because substantially similar claims had been asserted by Mr. Estes in a federal 
brought pursuant to Rule 56, and should be treated by this Court as a motion for summary 
judgment. 
15
 Again, counsel for the Judge offered evidence outside the pleadings in support 
of the motion, and the motion therefore must be treated as a motion for summary 
judgment. 
9 
court action against Judge Rigtrup, among others; and (iv) was barred because the 
conduct alleged by Mr. Estes did not amount to a violation of section 78-35-1 as a matter 
of law. [Rigtrup R. 173-74]. On March 17, 1997, Mr. Estes filed a Notice of Appeal. 
[Rigtrup R. 179]. 
On August 26, 1996, Mr. Estes filed his complaint against Judge Sawaya in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County. [Sawaya R. 1-2]. On 
November 6, 1996, the Judge filed a motion to dismiss and supporting memorandum 
seeking dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those set forth in the Tibbs 
and Rigtrup cases. [Sawaya R. 21-147]. Following briefing and oral argument, the 
district court dismissed the complaint on the same grounds as the Rigtrup case. [Sawaya 
R. 185-87]. Mr. Estes filed his Notice of Appeal on March 17, 1997. [Sawaya R. 188]. 
This Court consolidated all three cases for purposes of appeal, and appointed 
counsel to represent Mr. Estes. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A statement of facts beyond that set forth in the Statement of the Case set forth 
above is not necessary to the resolution of the issues presented in this appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court incorrectly dismissed Mr. Estes' complaints on the 
grounds they were barred by the notice-of-claim provisions of the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act. That Act, however, does not apply to Mr. Estes' claims under section 78-
35-1 because his claims are not for an "injury" as that term is defined in the 
Governmental Immunity Act. Mr. Estes' claims also were dismissed as untimely. 
10 
However, neither the Judges, nor the district courts, have properly considered Mr. Estes' 
argument that the limitation period should be tolled. 
Two of Mr. Estates' complaints were dismissed as being barred by the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. That doctrine, however, does not apply because the claims he asserted 
in federal court against the Judges were different than the claims raised in the complaints 
below; and in addition, the federal court claims were not competently, fully, and fairly 
litigated. Finally, two of the district courts concluded that Mr. Estes had not stated a 
claim for violation of § 78-35-1. Mr. Estes maintains that these decisions were erroneous 
and should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURTS IMPROPERLY RULED THAT MR. ESTES' 
CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY UTAH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT. 
In each of the consolidated cases, the district courts dismissed Mr. Estes' 
complaints on the ground that he had failed to comply with the notice-of-claim provisions 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-11(2), -12, -15. The 
district courts found that because Mr. Estes had failed to provide written notice to the 
Attorney General's office within one year after Mr. Estes' claims arose, his lawsuits were 
jurisdictionally barred. [Tibbs R. 179-80; Rigtrup R. 173-74; Sawaya R. 185-87]. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, including its notice-of-claim provisions, 
does not apply to Mr. Estes' claims under section 78-35-1 of the Utah Code. The 
Governmental Immunity Act provides governmental entities limited immunity from suit 
for any "injury" which results from, among other things, the exercise of a governmental 
11 
function. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3. The notice-of-claim provision states, "[a]ny 
person having a claim for injury against a governmental entity, or against an employee for 
an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties . . . shall file a written 
notice of claim . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(2) (emphasis added). The act defines 
"injury" as "death, injury to a person, damage to or loss of property, or any other injury 
that a person may suffer to his person, or estate, that would be actionable if inflicted by a 
private person or his agent." Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5). 
Mr. Estes' suits under section 78-35-1 are not claims for "injury" as that term is 
defined in the Governmental Immunity Act. Instead, Mr. Estes seeks recovery of a fine or 
penalty imposed by the legislature on a class of public officials for specific category of 
wrongful conduct. The injury Mr. Estes complains of— wrongful refusal to issue a writ 
of habeas corpus ~ is not an injury to his person or property.16 The fact that the statute 
imposes a fine of $5,000 regardless of individual circumstances demonstrates that the 
statute is not intended to compensate a plaintiff for personal injuries caused by 
wrongfully refusing to issue a writ.17 
Requiring a notice of claim would not further the policy justifications for the 
notice-of-claim requirement. "[A] notice of claim provides the governmental unit with an 
16
 The fact that the statute defines "injury" by reference to conduct "that would be 
actionable if inflicted by a private person or his agent" is significant. No one other than a 
judge may violate section 78-35-1 and, consequently, the conduct would not "be 
actionable if inflicted by a private person . . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(5). 
17
 If the Governmental Immunity Act were found to apply to claims under section 
78-35-1, then it would logically apply to any action brought against a government official 
to require that official's compliance with the law. 
12 
opportunity to promptly investigate and to remedy any defect immediately, before 
additional injury is caused; it helps avoid unnecessary litigation; it minimizes difficulties 
that might arise from changes in administrations." Sears v. Southworth. 563 P.2d 192, 
193 (Utah 1977). Providing notice of a violation of section 78-35-1 would not further 
any of these goals because the harm cannot be remedied, nor can the fine be imposed, 
without further action by a court. The violation is complete and uncorrectable when 
made and cannot be remedied, either for the petitioner effected or anyone else, by any 
amount of investigation the Attorney General or the Administrative Office of the Courts. 
The district courts incorrectly ruled that Mr. Estes' claims were barred by the notice 
requirements of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURTS IMPROPERLY RULED THAT MR. ESTES5 
CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
In each of the consolidated cases, the district courts also dismissed Mr. Estes' 
complaints on the ground that they were barred by the statute of limitations. [Tibbs R. 
179-80; Rigtrup R. 173-74; Sawaya R. 185-87]. Mr. Estes filed his complaints against 
Judges Tibbs and Rigtrup in July 1996, and he filed his action against Judge Sawaya in 
August 1996. [Tibbs R. 1-3; Rigtrup R. 1-3; Sawaya R. 1-2]. The conduct giving rise to 
the claim against Judge Tibbs' occurred in late 1991 and early 1992. [Tibbs R. 1-3]. The 
conduct giving rise to the claim against Judge Rigtrup occurred in April 1990 [Rigtrup R. 
43-46], and the conduct giving rise to the claim against Judge Sawaya occurred in July 
1990 [Sawaya R. 47-48]. The Judges have argued, and Mr. Estes agrees, that his claims 
13 
are subject to the one-year statute of limitations contained in section 78-12-29.18 
The district courts, however, failed to address Mr. Estes' argument that the 
limitations period should be tolled. Mr. Estes argued below that the limitations period 
should have been tolled during the time he was incarcerated. In addition, the limitations 
period should have been tolled during the pendency of an action filed by Mr. Estes in 
federal court raising similar issues against these defendants. Both of these issues raise 
factual questions that preclude summary judgment and which cannot be resolved on the 
basis of the record before this Court. 
This Court may affirm the district courts grant of summary judgment only if there 
are no disputed issues of material fact, and the Court concludes that the Judges are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56; In re West. 948 P.2d 351 
(Utah 1997). In reviewing the grant of summary judgment, the Court must view all facts 
in the light most favorable to Mr. Estes. Hipwell v. IHC Hosp.. 944 P.2d 327, 328 (Utah 
1997). In the proceedings below, the Judges failed to address the factual and legal 
argument made by Mr. Estes concerning tolling the statute of limitations, and offered no 
evidence on the subject. Similarly, the district courts did not make any findings or rule 
18
 This concession by the Judges bolsters the arguments set forth in Part I above 
regarding the inapplicability of the Government Immunity Act's notice provisions to 
these claims — the Judges agree that Mr. Estes' claim is "[a]n action . . . upon a statute for 
a penalty or forfeiture," Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-29(2), and therefore not an action for 
injury to person or property. 
If, however, the one-year statute of limitations does not apply, Mr. Estes' claims 
would be governed by the residual four-year statute of limitations set forth in section 78-
12-25(3) of the Utah Code. Regardless of which limitations period applies, however, 
factual questions regarding tolling of the statute of limitations preclude dismissal of Mr. 
Estes' claims. 
14 
directly on this issue. 
This Court has recognized that a statute of limitations will be tolled in 
"exceptional circumstances where the application of the general rule would be 'irrational 
or unjust.'" See Sew v. Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 636 (Utah 1995). '"The 
ultimate determination of whether a case presents exceptional circumstances that render 
the application of a statute of limitations irrational or unjust' is a balancing test. The 
balancing test weighs the hardships imposed on the claimant by the application of the 
statute of limitations against any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the passage of 
time." Id (quoting Warren v. Provo Citv Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)). 
Factors the Court considers include whether the defendant's problems caused by the 
passage of time are greater than the plaintiffs . . . whether the claim has aged to the point 
that witnesses cannot be located, evidence cannot be found, and the parties cannot 
remember basic events." Id (citing Klinger v. Kightlv. 791 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 1990) 
and Mvers v. McDonald. 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981)). 
In this case, Mr. Estes argued below that the limitations period should have been 
tolled during the time he was in prison because, among other things, he lacked access to a 
lawyer or a legal library that would have permitted him to pursue his claims.19 [Tibbs R. 
151-52] Mr. Estes argued, in essence, that it would be "irrational or unjust" not to toll the 
statute of limitations. The balancing test supports this argument. The Judges will not 
19
 Prior to 1987, section 78-12-36 of the Utah Code provided that limitations 
period would be tolled during the period the plaintiff "was imprisoned on a criminal 
charge." See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36 (1987); see also Smith v. Cook. 803 P.2d 788, 
790 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In 1987, however, the legislature deleted this provision from 
section 78-12-36. 
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suffer any hardship if the statute is tolled because all of the relevant evidence is set forth 
in the various records of the proceedings and there are no witnesses to be located. Mr. 
Estes, on the other hand, would lose his cause of action if the statute were applied. He 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district courts' rulings on the statute of 
limitations issue or, alternatively, remand these cases to the district courts for more 
particularized findings on the balancing factors applicable to claims for equitable tolling. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURTS IMPROPERLY RULED THAT MR. ESTES' 
CLAIMS WERE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF COLLATERAL 
ESTOPPEL. 
The district courts in the Rigtrup and Sawaya cases also dismissed Mr. Estes' 
claims on the ground that they were barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. [Rigtrup 
R. 173-74; Sawaya R. 185-87]. The district court in the Tibbs case declined to dismiss 
the complaint on this basis. [Tibbs R. 1-3]. The Judges argued that Mr. Estes had raised 
these claims in a civil conspiracy lawsuit he had previously filed in federal court. That 
lawsuit named the individual Judges as defendants, and was dismissed in 1995 for failing 
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. A copy of Mr. Estes' complaint, and 
the Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba, are included in the 
Addendum.20 
Mr. Estes asserted, as part of his alleged civil conspiracy, the conduct of Judges 
Tibbs, Rigtrup, and Sawaya that gives rise to these cases. [Tibbs R. 79-80]. He did not, 
however, assert claims against any of them for violation of section 78-35-1. A party may 
20
 Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba's Report and Recommendation was adopted by 
Chief Judge David Winder, and Mr. Estes' complaint was dismissed on April 12, 1995. 
16 
be collaterally estopped from asserting a claim if the following conditions are met: 
First, the party must show that the issue challenged in the case at hand is identical 
to the issue decided in the previous action. Second, the issue in the previous 
action must have been decided in a final judgment on the merits. Third, the issue 
in the previous action must have been competently, fully, and fairly litigated. 
Fourth, the opposing party in the action at hand must have been either a party or 
privy to the previous action. 
Sew v. Security Title Co.. 902 P.2d 629, 632 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added). Although it 
is undisputed that the second and fourth elements are satisfied, the other requirements 
have not been met. The issue decided in the federal action is not identical to the issue in 
the underlying cases. While the federal lawsuit was based upon the same factual 
predicate, it alleged claims for civil conspiracy in violation of the federal constitution and 
statutes. Mr. Estes did not assert a claim for violation of section 78-35-1, which is the 
sole claim raised in these cases. In addition, the issues were not competently, fully, and 
fairly litigated because the case was dismissed on motion before any discovery and Mr. 
Estes was representing himself, pro se, against numerous attorneys for the various 
defendants. The rulings by the district courts in the Rigtrup and Sawaya cases relying on 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel as a bar to Mr. Estes' claims are erroneous and should 
be reversed. 
IV. MR. ESTES' COMPLAINTS STATED CLAIMS UPON WHICH RELIEF 
MAY BE GRANTED. 
The district courts in the Rigtrup and Sawaya cases also dismissed Mr. Estes' 
claims on the ground that they failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
[Rigtrup R. 173-74; Sawaya R. 185-87]. Again, the district court in the Tibbs case 
declined to dismiss the complaint on this basis. [Tibbs R. 1-3]. In each of the cases, the 
17 
Judges argued that their conduct was not "wrongful" or "willful" and therefore Mr. Estes 
had not stated a claim for relief under section 78-35-1. Mr. Estes contends there are 
factual issues which preclude entry of summary judgment, or dismissal on the basis of 
Rule 12(b)(6), and the cases should be remanded for trial. Specifically, Mr. Estes 
contends that each of the named defendants violated section 78-35-1 for the following 
reasons. 
A. Estes v. Tibbs. 
First, Judge Tibbs dismissed Mr. Estes' habeas petition on the ground that he had 
named as the sole defendant the acting warden of the Central Utah Correctional Facility 
who, he ruled, had not violated any of Mr. Estes' constitutional rights. Mr. Estes 
contends this ruling was incorrect21 and violated section 78-35-1. 
Second, following remand of this case from the court of appeals, Mr. Estes 
amended his writ to name the Utah Board of Pardons, but the district court notified him 
that it would not be accepted because the Sixth Circuit Court, where he originally filed 
his writ, no longer existed. Mr. Estes contends this conduct violates section 78-35-1. 
Third, when Mr. Estes tried to file the amended writ in the Sixth District Court, 
the court refused to accept it without a filing fee or writ of impecuniosity. Mr. Estes 
contends this conduct violates section 78-35-1 because, among other things, he was 
attempting to amend his original writ (which was filed without a filing fee or writ of 
21
 This ruling was affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals on different grounds. 
The Utah Court of Appeals held that the warden was properly a party, but Mr. Estes also 
should have named as a defendant the Utah Board of Pardons. Estes v. Van Per Veur, 
824 P.2d 1200, 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
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PAT BARTHOLOMEW 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
Supreme Court Consolidated 
Case No. 970193 
CORRECTION TO PAGE 18 OF 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Brent A. Burnett 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 E. 300 South 
Heber M. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City 84144 
Newton C. Estes 
372 E. 700 North 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Telephone: (801)544-5253 
In Coordination With 
Court-Appointed Counsel 
Todd M. Shaughnessy 
THE CORRECTION 
[I, the Plaintiff Newton Estes, believes this correction should 
be made prior to the AG's response; whereas my counsel believes it 
could just as well come after,] 
Delete under A. Estes v. Tibbs; 
Mr. Estes1 
"First, Judge Tibbs dismissed^ habeas corpus 
petition on the ground that he had named as the sole 
defendant the acting warden of the Utah Correctional 
Facility who, he ruled, had not violated any of Mr. 
Estes' constitutional rights." 
Instead, make it to read: 
"First, Judge Tibbs dismissed Mr. Estes1 habeas 
petition on the sole ground that he had named as 
defendant the warden of the Central Utah Correctional 
Facility who, as he ruled in accordance with the AGTs 
Argument, had not been alleged to have taken one action 
fthat would deprive Plaintiff of his constitutional 
rights or liberties. Indeed, the only connection 
between Plaintiff and Mr. Van Der Veur is the fact 
that Mr. Van Der Veur is the Warden of the prison 
where Plaintiff is housed.1" 
The differences are important because saying "sole defendant" 
makes it seem Tibbs may have ruled there should have been an 
additional defendant. That could lend substance to what happened 
to my appeal,wherein the Court of Appeals in Estes v. Van Der Veur 
824 P.2d 1201(1992), stated I had been properly dismissed in the 
"court below" on the ground I had failed to name the Board of 
Pardons as an additional defendant. 
As quoted above, no such suggestion had ever been made by 
Judge Tibbs (or the Attorney General) in the court below. 
DATED this^/^day of April, 1998. 
By jfyuAyt^C^ Y ^ W ^ 
Newton C. Estes 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I hereby certify that on this'lg^Ki lay 
of April, 1998, I mailed a copy of the foregoing Correction to Page 
18 to Assistant AG Brent A. Burnett, 160 E. 300 South, Salt Lake 
City 84144. 
%IA£^6,&&* &0— 
Newton C. Estes 
IP 
impecuniosity) and because section 21-7-2(2)(c) of the Utah Code states that no filing 
fees may be charged "in cases of habeas corpus . . . . " 
B. Estes v. Rigtrup. 
Judge Rigtrup denied Mr. Estes' writ of habeas corpus and, during the hearing on 
that writ, stated "[t]his Court cannot correct another district judge, or second guess him, 
because of his judgement exercised in sentencing." [Rigtrup. R. 1-2]. Mr. Estes contends 
this comment, combined with the denial of his writ, violates section 78-35-1. 
Judge Rigtrup also refused to accept the evidence offered by Mr. Estes of 
"unusual circumstances" justifying an exception to the general rule regarding issues that 
may be raised in postconviction proceedings. He maintains that this is violates section 
78-35-1. 
C. Estes v. Sawaya. 
Following the dismissal by Judge Rigtrup, Mr. Estes filed a habeas petition in 
Third District Court that was assigned to Judge Sawaya. The State filed and briefed a 
motion to dismiss, and the district court, relying on Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, dismissed the petition on the grounds that Mr. Estes had failed to 
demonstrate why this issue had not been previously raised. Mr. Estes contends that Judge 
Sawaya's dismissal violated section 78-35-1 because Rule 4-501 expressly states that it 
"does not apply to petitions for habeas corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief. Utah 
Code Jud. Admin. Rule 4-501, Applicability. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, appellant respectfully requests that the orders entered 
by the district courts in each of these consolidated cases be reversed, and that the cases be 
remanded for trials on the merits. 
DATED this of April, 1998. 
SNELL & WILMER 
Todd M. Shai 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this of April, 1998,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be sent to the following, 
via United States Mail, postage prepaid: 
Brent A. Burnett 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Heber Wells Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
SHAUGHT\SLC\061015.01 
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JOHN P. SOLTIS - 3040 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM-1231 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
Judge Don V. Tibbs 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801)366-0100 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUDGE DON V. TIBBS, : 
Defendants. : 
: ORDER 
Civil No. 960601239 
Judge Kay L. Mclff 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 19th day of February, 1997 at 
11:00 a.m. before the Honorable Kay L. Mclff, Judge of the above entitled court on the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice. The plaintiff Newton C. Estes was personally 
present and appeared pro se. The defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General John 
P. Soltis. The Court reviewed all pleadings, memorandum and exhibits on file, heard oral 
argument and being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Order: 
1. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalties ($15,000) for THREE 78-35-1 Violations 
is dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah 
r i :, ) 
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Code Ann. §§63-30-11, -12 and plaintiff s civil action is jurisdictionally barred; 
2. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalties ($15,000) for THREE 78-35-1 Violations 
is dismissed with prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of limitations pursuant to the 
Judicial Code, Utah Code Ann. §§78-12-25 -29 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally 
c^^y?f?*\l&~-— i//f» 
DATEDLthis^ X day of W iHUkh, 1997. 
SBY THE COURT 
IG CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, 
.St 
this^l day of February, 1997, to the following: 
Newton C. Estes 
372 East 700 North 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
(801) 544-5253 
V» fl J>u- foxl w 
JOHN P. SOLTIS - 3040 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM-1231 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
Judge James Kenneth Rigtrup 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801)366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
Plaintiff Pro Se, 
vs. 
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP, : 
Defendant. : 
: ^y 
/ 
/ 
Civil No. 960905255 CV 
/ 
/ 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 12th day of February, 1997 at 8:00 a.m. 
before the Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Judge of the above entitled court on the Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice. The plaintiff Newton C. Estes was personally present and 
appeared pro se. The defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General John P. Soltis. 
The Court reviewed all pleadings, memorandum and exhibits on file, heard oral argument and 
being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Order: 
i-i 
1. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs 
Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§63-30-
11,-12 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally barred; 
2. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs 
Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of limitations pursuant to the Judicial Code, Utah 
Code Ann. §§78-12-25 -29 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally barred; 
3. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs 
Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed with 
prejudice by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and 
4. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs 
Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
DATED t h i s ^ day O^^JJ^XM^ ^>1997. 
BY THE COURT 
JUDGE ROBERT K. HILDER 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, this 
/ Q J L day of February, 1997, to the following: 
Newton C. Estes 
372 East 700 North 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
(801) 544-5253 
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JOHN P. SOLUS - 3040 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM-1231 
Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801)366-0100 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA, 
Defendant. 
ivil No. 960905955 CV 
Judge Robert K. Hilder 
This matter came on regularly for hearing on the 12th day of February, 1997 at 
8:00 a.m. before the Honorable Robert K. Hilder, Judge of the above entitled court on the 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss With Prejudice. The plaintiff Newton C. Estes was personally 
present and appeared pro se. The defendant was represented by Assistant Attorney General John 
P. Soltis. The Court reviewed all pleadings, memorandum and exhibits on file, heard oral 
argument and being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Order: 
1. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed 
with prejudice for failure to comply with the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§63-30-11, -12 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally barred; 
2. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed 
with prejudice for failure to comply with the statute of limitations pursuant to the Judicial Code, 
Utah Code Ann. §§78-12-25 -29 and plaintiffs civil action is jurisdictionally barred; 
3. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed 
with prejudice by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and 
4. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
plaintiffs Petition for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) for 78-35-1 Violation is dismissed 
with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
DATED this«ffi~day
 0 f < ^ X ^ ^ y , 1997 
OBERT K. HILDER 
2 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER, 
this /^rMay of February, 1997, to the following: 
Newton C. Estes 
372 East 700 North 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
(801)544-5253 
i \J)HJ I y i o - f t ^ p 
Newton C. Estes 
372 East 700 North 
Kaysville, Ut 84037 
Tel: 801/544-5253 
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IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COtf&fKfr' UTAH 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
P l a i n t i f f Pro Se, 
- v s -
JUDGE DON V. TIBBS, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 960601239 
Judge Kay L. Mclff 
I hereby file this Notice of Appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court of Judge Mclff's March 5, 1997 Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice of my Petition For Recovery of Monetary Penalties 
($15,000) For Three 78-35-1 Violations. 
Affidavit of impecuniosity attached. 
/Wt^T6xfe*£L. 
Newton C. Estes 
March 17, 1997 
Certificate of Mailing: I hereby certify that on this 17th 
day of March, 1997, I mailed a copy of the above Notice of Appeal 
to defendant's defense counsel and assistant attorney general, 
John P. Soltis at P.O. Box 140856, Salt Lake City 84114. 
/llLi^C^h C. i<t^ 
Newton C. Estes 
Newton C. estes 
372 East 700 North 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
Plaintiff Pro Se, 
-vs-
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
and 
JUDGE JAMES SAWAYA, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No.s' 
Jud'ge Rober Hilder 
/ 
I hereby file this Notice of Appeal[s] to the Utah Supreme 
Court of Judge Hilderfs February 28, 1997 Orders of Dismissal of 
my Petition[s] for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) For 78-
35-1 Violation[s] against the two judges captioned above. 
Affidavit of impecuniosity attached. 
%!.&«.£.&&. 
Newton C. Estes 
March 17, 1997 
Certificate of Mailing: I hereby certify that on this 17th 
day of March> 1997, T mailed a copy of this Notice of Appeal to 
defendants' defense counsel and assistant attorney general, John 
P. Soltis at P.O. Box 140856, Salt Lake City 84114. 
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Newton C. estes 
372 East 700 North 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
Plaintiff Pro Se, 
-vs-
JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRU? 
and 
JUDGE JAMES SAWAYA, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL[S] 
/ 
Case Nos 
fudge Robert K. Hilder 
I hereby file this Notice of Appealfs] to the Utah Supreme 
Court of Judge HilderTs February 28, 1997 Orders of Dismissal of 
my Petition[s] for Recovery of Monetary Penalty ($5,000) For 78-
35-1 Violation[s] against the two judges captioned above. 
Affidavit of impecuniosity attached. 
&> 
Newton C. Estes 
March 17, 1997 
Certificate of Mailing: I hereby certify that on this 17th 
day of March,
 1 9g 7 j j mailed a copy of this Notice of Appeal to 
defendants' defense counsel and assistant attorney general, John 
P. Soltis at P.O. Box 140856, Salt Lake City 84114. 
Newton C. Estes 
hq 
Newton C. Estes 
372 East 700 North 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Ph: 544-5253 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT' COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
P l a i n t i f f , Pro Se 
v s . 
25 CONSPIRATORS IN APPROXIMATE 
CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF THEIR 
PARTICIPATION: 
AMENDED 
COMPLAINT OF CONSPIRACY 
TO DENY CIVIL RIGHTS 
94-NC-Q89 
Case No 
1) BRIAN NAMBA, Davis County prosecutor; 2) STEVE VANDERLINDEN, 
defense attorney and public defender; 3) JUDY VALEIKA, AP&P inves t iga tor ; 
4) Judge DOUGLAS CORNABY: 5) JAY EDMONDS, appeal attorney; 6) DAN 
LARSEN, Ass i s tant AG; 7) Judge KENNETH RIGTRUP; 8) Judge JAMES 
SAWAYA: 9) CRAIG LUDWIG, Third D i s t r i c t Court Clerk; 10) Federal Judge 
DAVID SAM; 11) ANGELA MICKLOS, Ass i s tant AG; 12) GARY DeLAND, 
past Corrections director; 13) LANE McCOTTER, Corrections d irec tor ; 
14) ELDON BARNES, former Draper warden; 15) FRED VAN DER VEUR, 
Gunnison warden; 16) PETE HAUN, former Parole Board chairman; 17) 
MICHAEL SIBBETT, Parole Board chairman; 18) LORENZO MILLER, Assistant 
AG; 19) Judge DON TIBBS; 2 0 ) KIRK TORGENSEN, Assistant AG; 
Presiding 
21) Judge MICHAEL J . MURPHY; 22) Judge JOHN WAHLQUIST; 23) DAVID 
CARLSON, Ass i s tant AG; 24) DEAN W. SHEFFIELD, Judic ia l Conduct Commission; 
25) P . GARY FERRERO, Utah State Bar, 
Defendants. 
1. 
INTRODUCTION 
This complaint is about a conspiracy to nullify plea bargains by sus-
pending habeas corpus review of courtroom victims receiving original-charge 
punishments througn the use of false secret information by the sentencing judge 
and parole board. The purpose is to achieve the same result without the cost of 
a trial. 
JURISDICTION 
This action arises under the Constitution of cne United States, plus 
the First, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to it, as well as Title 42 
United States Code Section 1883, 42 USC 1985, 42 USC 1986, 28 USC 1331, 18 USC 
241 &242 and the 1871 Civil Rights Enforcement Act. 
Title 28 USC 1343 confers jurisdiction upon this Court to conduct the 
trial. 
Plaintiff, Newton C. Estes, is a citizen of tne United States of 
America and a resident of Kaysville, Davis County in the State of Utah. 
Defendants, at the time material to this action, were duly elected, 
appointed, or otherwise employed by this State or the U.S. government. Accor-
dingly, all actions complained of were undertaken under color of state law or 
under the authority of the United States. 
NOTE: IF THE COURT SHOULD DETERMINE MY RESEARCH AND EXPERIENCE AS A 
VICTIM QUALIFIES ME AS ONE WHO WILL BE ABLE TO ADEQUATELY PROTECT THE INTERESTS 
OF A CLASS OF A POSSIBLE 1000 OTHER VICTIMS, I NOW SUGGEST CONVERTING THIS TO 
A CLASS ACTION SUIT. 
This conversion could be accompanied by a preliminary announcement that 
this Court would strictly adhere to the same requirements of leniency the law 
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has imposed upon it in individual pro se civil rights complaints* Specifically, 
that causes of action are to be accorded reasonable intent so that close calls will 
always be decided in favor of the pleader, and that timely notice of any serious 
deficiencies will enable me to amend effectively. 
1) BRIAN NAMBA, Davis County prosecutor, at Davis County Court Complex, 
800 West State Street, Farmington, UT, started his participation in the conspiracy 
to nullify plea bargains at my January 1988 arraignment in the circuit court in 
Layton when, after I had asked him to recommend an attorney, he named Steve Vander-
linden. I had believed he would of course name one who would adhere to the mecha-
nics of due process so that coming events would not be tainted. 
a) Instead, he named one whom he knew had been involved in an 18-year 
conspiracy to keep defendants from ever getting the due process of 6th Amendment 
hearings to challenge lies called out by the judge from documents Vanderlinden 
either never presented or did not examine with them. 
b) Furthermore, upon information and belief, he as prosecutor was the 
due course author of the frame-up June 21, 1988 affidavit in case D.C. #1-5983 
admitting to the original charges Vanderlinden had tried to get me to sign—thus 
conspiring to violate my 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination. 
In addition to violating the Constitution, the above conduct also violates 
Utah's canon of ethicsT "duty to uphold legal process...[and being a factor] in 
preserving government under law..." The law involving tested-for-accuracy pre-
sentence reports is embodied in the Lipsey, Casarez and Howell decisions. 
Discovery will determine how many defendants prosecuted by Namba and 
defended by Vanderlinden got to examine their PSI reports for accuracy. 
I will put in evidence the original-charge affidavit Vanderlinden tried 
to get me to sign whose authorship will be derermined at trial, or by the defendants 
3. 
sworn answer to this complaint that prosecutors never prepare the words and intent 
of plea bargain affidavits. 
iMy ACTUAL INJURY was 5 years in prison for which I ask the Court and 
jury to require Namba to pay me a proportional $25,000 for having thus deliber-
ately conspired to cripple, rather than uphold legal process. Punitive damages will 
depend on his testimony. 
2) STEVE VANDERLINDEN, defense attorney and public defender who lived at 
3208 S. North Canyon Circle in Bountiful, UT, participated in the conspirecy des-
cribed above by: 
a) trying to trick me into pleading guilty to the original charges as 
contained in an affidavit dated June 21, 1988. 
b) after that had failed when I discovered the deception and demanded 
the words be changed, he set out to deprive me of my 5th and 6th Amendment rights 
not to be punished without due process of law and confronting my accusers extended 
to all by the 14th Amendment by failing to obtain my presentence report available 
to him the previous Friday, July 15 until 20 minutes before the scheduled 9 AM Tues. 
sentencing. This allowed totally insufficient time to locate and challenge the 
lies I discovered in its many pages (PSI reporter Judy Valeika said it was the 
largest ever prepared in Davis County) after the Utah Supreme Court finally arran-
ged for me to be provided a copy. 
c) After not having turned one page or read one sentence while me and my 
daughter were calling out the lies we had time to see, and after hearing me tell 
Judge Cornaby it was full of lies, he deprived me my 6th Amendment right to confront 
my accusers by not demanding (or even suggesting) such a hearing. Thus his conspi-
ring to deny me the equal protection of the Lipsev-Casarez-Howell caused me to get 
sentenced as a dangerous repeat offender who had another neighborhood victim. 
4. 
d) His final act in conspiring to deny me due process
 0f law was. a 
criminal one needing investigation by the U.S. Attorney: he committed outright 
perjury in federal court on November 17, 1992 at my habeas hearing of case #9Q-C-
668-S by stating PSI reports are never available till justLbefore sentencing, whereas 
the truth is they are available 3 days ahead of time. He committed additional 
perjury when he said my fear of media exposure had caused me to request he allow 
evidence against me to be illegally given to the judge in chambers (without me even 
knowing its content). 
The evidence I will be able to offer the jury is: (a) the bogus affi-
davit of original charges I refused to sign which I retreived from Vanderlinden!s 
office wastebasket; (b) Judge Cornaby's Sept. 27, 1988 transcribed certificate of 
probable cause statement that PSI reports become available 3 days before senten-
cing, plus the cover page of mine showing such was the case with my report; (c) 
eleven handwritten pages of lies I sent Jay Edmonds to use in my appeal which I 
discovered only after I was in prison and had time to read the gigantic PSI report, 
and the transcript of my sentencing hearing where I told the judge it was full of 
lies. My step-daughter, Margaret Erickson will testify that only she and I, not 
Vanderlinden, performed any examination of the report and that as we commented on 
the lies we did see, he uttered not one word; (d) his perjury will be shown in 
the transcript of his statements at my November 17, 1992 habeas hearing before 
Magistrate Boyce and a July 12, 1988 statement I had prepared to read to Judge 
Cornaby about I wanted everything against me presented in open court. I never 
got to go in chambers and present it, however, because, after calling me at work 
to rush up to Farmington to "prevent Namba from presenting the Playboys , he went 
into chambers without me and thereby let Namba present secret-from-me maximum 
sentence recommendation and notice of intent to use hearsay at sentencing which 
listed how search warrant evidence showed my criminal mind set. 
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Solid evidence of my version of that July 12 fiasco is that Namba 
concluded my showing the victim a book called Monster Rallv showed I wanted the 
victim to be exposed to aberrations such as devil worship in order to break down 
parental relationships. Had I ever seen his documents, I would not have let the 
judge use those same words to sentence me when that book is considered the 
classic work by America's best loved cartoonist, Charles Addams. The whole book 
came from the pages of the New Yorker. 
My ACTUAL INJURY at the hands of Mr. Vanderlinden was 5 years in prison 
for which I ask the Court and jury to hold him at least three fifths responsible 
for 60 months at $3500—or $126,000. 
In the belief that I should be awarded something in the ballpark of S5 
million PUNITIVE DAMAGES, I pray that this defendant be held liable for at least 
6% of the grand total—or $300,000. 
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover which past or present plea 
bargain inmates never got to study their possibly damaging PSI reports, and 
identify their lawyers. 
3) JUDY VALEIKA, AP&P investigator/reporter who works at 99 S. Main 
in Farmington, similarly conspired to deny me my 5th, 6th and 14th Amendment rights 
to the due process of confronting accusers or examining her other information to 
the court by: 
a) telling me the accused are never allowed to examine their PSI 
reports. That lie paved the way for her to solicit and report rumors to the judge 
and 
totally unconfirmed reports there had been another neightborhood victim. 
b) It also enabled her to tell me she had been unable to discover any 
underlying cause for which I could qualify for outpatient treatment (as 
recommended by Dr. Roby, I later found out). She consequently told me that, unless 
I could come up with another instance of child molestation, she would have to 
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report that ray act had been inexcusably willful. Accordingly, I invented such an 
instance. Judge Cornaby, however, used it to call me a repeat offender and out 
me in prison instead of using it to justify the suspended sentence or probation 
my age, clean past and crime would warrant. 
Thus her conspiracy with the judge and my lawyer prevented my getting 
the equal protection of Lipsv-Howell-Casarez case law that I be able to challenge 
Illustrative was her fraudulent aggravating circumstance #10 and 
her accuracy and fairness. 
omission of all mitigating including obvious #9, 10 and 11. 
Circumstantial evidence of the above conspiracy and lending solid cre-
dence to ijiy version of the events would be to discover if her other clients were 
also told they could not see their PSI reports, (claim a)- Additionally, calling 
as witness the interviewees of my report can be expected to show rumors and exag-
gerations were actually solicited by telling them I would never get to see what 
they said. 
b) My complete AP&P file (not the report) should come in under discovery 
to search for any internal notes about how it was a problem that Dr. Roby believed 
incarceration was uncalled for. 
My ACTUAL INJURY at Ms. ValeikaTs hands was 5 years in prison for which 
I ask the Court and jury to hold her one tenth responsible—or 6 months at $3500 
for a claim of $21,000. I further pray for a 3% PUNITIVE liability of $150,000. 
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to ask all present and past inmates if 
their PSI reporters told them they could not see their reports and if the contents 
may have hurt them. 
4) JUDGE DOUGLAS CORNABY, former 2nd District Court judge who now lives 
at 3612 N 2900 E, Layton, UT, similarly conspired to deny me equal protection 
of Lipsev-Howell-Casarez case law requiring to be based on information checked 
for accuracy by defendant when he ridiculed my courtroom claims of PSI report 
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lies and false rumors and said I only wanted to confront those accusers so I 
could use my domineering abilities and get them to change their stories. This 
enabled him to sentence me as a high risk offender with deep-seated sexual pro-
blems, using the unseen PSI report lie of another neighborhood victim and my 
Valeika-solicited invention of an event 39 years previous. 
The transcript of the July 19, 1988 sentencing hearing is the proof I 
will be offering the jury. Also a 5/31/88 letter to him about finding rumor sources. 
My ACTUAL INJURY was 5 years in prison for which I ask the Court and jury 
to hold Judge Cornaby at least three tenths responsible—or 18 months at S3500 
for a claim of $63,000. I further pray for a 6% PUNITIVE liability of $300,000. 
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover which plea bargain inmates 
heard their judge refer to damaging challengeable information without ever being 
asked by the judge if they had examined the PSI report. 
5) Appeal attorney JAY EDMONDS who resides at 1660 Orchard Drive in 
Salt Lake City participated in the conspiracy to have plea bargainers sentenced 
to original charge punishments through the use of false secret information by 
refusing to appeal Steve Vanderlinden's causing that to have happened to me. His 
guilt, however, would be contingent upon discovering if he has appeared in court-
rooms as defense attorney and if he regularly prevented his clients from exami-
ning their presentence reports. < H e a l s o refused my written request that 
the AGfs response be answered.) 
In that event, I would introduce the eleven pages of PSI report lies and 
inaccuracies I sent him from prison and ask him to tell the jury if he had any 
other explanation why he had decided Vanderlindenrs allowing all this to go to 
Judge Cornaby unchallenged,and thus used to deny me a punishment fitting my crime, 
was unworthy of being appealed. 
My ACTUAL INJURY in this claim can not be calculated by months, so I ask 
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for an arbitrary one-year compensatory liability of $42,000. No PUNITIVE. 
6) DAN R. LARSEN, Assistant Attorney General who works at AG headquarters 
at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, is heavily involved in the conspiracy to 
have plea bargainers get the same punishment as if found guilty by a jury on the 
original charges because of his part in the courtroom conspiracy to suspend 
prisonersf basic First Amendment right to obtain redress through the absolute 
right to use habeas corpus to challenge and correct judges' unconstitutional 
actions at sentencing. 
a) He admitted at the dismissal hearing of my Third District Court habeas 
petition #900901219 that "there is no relief for Constitutional violations in the 
State of Utah". 
b) He next demonstrated how he has been able to bring about this unpre-
cedented suspension when, in my next habeas application #900903466, he conspired 
with Judge Sawaya to use UCJA Rule 4-501 to dismiss my petition illegally. 
My proof of item (a) will be Carlton Way's transcript of that hearing; and 
for (b) it will be the submission of the court's Minute Entry granting Mr. Larsen?s 
motion, and reading the rule itself forbidding its use in a habeas corpus. 
My ACTUAL INJURY caused by his illegal action and his violating his canon 
of ethics to live up to his "duty to uphold legal process [and] in preserving 
government under law..." was the resulting 37 months of incarceration at $3500— 
or $129,500. I further pray for a 6% PUNITIVE liability of $300,000. 
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover how many times this rule has 
been so used on Utah prisoners and who the conspirators were. 
7) JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP participated in the conspiracy to suspend habeas 
corpus by: (a) admitting he does not allow his court to be used for habeas corpus 
review and correction of constitutional violations by fellow judges during their 
sentencing hearings, and (b) by saying that an appeal attorney's refusal to appeal 
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Vanderlinden's ineffectiveness (maybe because he was very effective for the pro-
secution?) was no excuse for my not having done so, thus rendering that issue not 
eligible for habeas corpus, 
I will offer absolute proof of the above when I read from Carlton Way's 
transcript of the above proceeding. 
My ACTUAL INJURY from the above outrageous supposedly judicial behavior 
(it violates Judicial Canon 3 B.(7) mandating my "full right to be heard according 
(3/31/90 dismissal—7/28/93 parole) 
to law.") was 40 months in prison at $3500—or $140,000. I further pray for a 
PUNITIVE liability of 6% of the $5 million dollars—or $300,000. 
8) JUDGE JAMES SAWAYA, as mentioned above in Defendant #6, conspired with 
that Asst. AG to illegally use UCJA 4-501 to dismiss my habeas petition. This 
denial of my 1st Amendment of access to legal redress for having been punished 
without due process not only violated Canon 3 B.(7)(8) of his code of ethics by 
denying my right to be heard and unfairly (illegally!) disposing of my judicial 
matter, but became criminally punishable under statute 78-35-1 for wrongful 
refusal to allow a habeas corpus. 
Need I mention that proof is obviously to be found in his Minute Entry of 
dismissal and then reading for the jury UCJA 4-501fs saying it may not be so used? 
My ACTUAL INJURY form the above illegal acts was 37 months in prison at 
$3500—or $129,500. I further pray for a 5% liability of the PUNITIVE damages 
of $5 million I am suggesting as a just punishment for these constitution-destroy-
ing conspirators—or $250,000. (37 months was from 7/7/90 dismissal to 8/93 parole) 
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to see which judges did this to 
how many prison inmates. 
9) CRAIG LUDWIG, Third District Court Clerk, also acting under color state 
law, compromised my 5th Amendment right to due process by not mailing me notifi-
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cation of either of Dan Larsen's two dismissal hearings that took place before 
Judge Rigtrup in case # 900901219. Proof will consist of Clerk Ludwig's expected 
inability to produce copies of any such notification. 
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover how many prisoners in Utah 
have thus been hustled up to court without knowing about it ahead of time or what 
the action would be about, and upon whose instructions this situation exists. 
My ACTUAL INJURY was 40 months in prison after the 3/31/90 dismissal for 
which I hold Mr. Ludwig at least 10% responsible for a liability of $14,000. No 
PUNITIVE. 
10) FEDERAL JUDGE DAVID SAM has undertaken a crucial dual role in the 
conspiracy to suspend habeas corpus review of unconstitutional and illegal senten-
cing thus making him liable for damages under 18 USC 242 as determined by this 
Court proceeding under 28 USC 1343 and 1331. 
In order to cripple inmates exercising their 1st Amendment right to gain 
redress, he dismissed my Bounds v Smith-based 42 USC 1983 civil rights complaint 
#92-C-223 of the prison denying prisoners both a law library or contract legal 
assistance. Also endorsed was the prison's denying typewriters and copy machines. 
His method of dismissing violated ray 5th Amendment right to due process, 
my 1st Amendment right of redress of grievances, and the 14th Amendment's exten-
sion of them to all Americans: 
a) First, he violated his own court rules by not allowing the Dept. of 
Corrections defendants to even learn they were being sued by never permitting 
the summonses to be served. PROOF will be the jury hearing Clerk Zimmerfs response 
that Judge Sam had not allowed him to serve summonses, and FRCP Rule 4(c)(2) 
saying that the judge must arrange for such service when the applicant has been 
granted in forma pauperis.
 0r the old Rule 4 (c)(2)(B)(i). 
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b) He next ^o^f^iS^withdrew the case from being preliminarily reviewed 
and reported on by the magistrate so he could personally enter the case as defense 
counsel! In further denial of due process and equal protection of the rules, he 
spent 85 days to frame an answer for the defendants which he used as grounds for 
dismissal- In essence that answer has the effect of repealing the use of 42 USC 
1983 civil rights complaints by all citizens of the United States.. 
\ PROOF of Nii^illegally\bypassing tha magistrate will tf^lettyig the W y 
hear Rule /\f the Feder^ Rules of Cy<n.l Procedure. A comparison of his 
defendant-answer/dismissal-order wording with the actual words of 42 USC 1983 
will let a jury determine if I was given equal protection of that law, and how 
such actions comport, with his performance of duties as set forth in Canon 3(B)(7) 
and (8) of his code of ethics. 
c) His next performance in the conspiracy to suspend habeas corpus was to 
accept his magistrate's recommendation for dismissal although it was based on 
VanderlindenTs perjury in Boyce's courtroom and a rejection and a rejection of 
obviously truthful testimony of both me and my step-daughter (the AG dared not 
cross-examine either one of us). Magistrate Boyce had no way to know for sure 
Vanderlinden was committing perjury although he heard me make that accusation. 
However, when I finally saw his Report and Recommendation was based almost 
exclusively on the perjuror's testimony, I submitted my official Objections which 
contained incontrovertible proof of that perjury. But Judge Sam decided that 
perjury is a perfectly acceptable basis for dismissing a habeas corpus complaint. 
This is tantamount to a suspension of habeas corpus and makes Judge Sam 
subject to punishment under 28 USC 1331 for depriving me of due process and equal 
protection of rules governing federal habeas corpus. 
PROOF will have the jury hear Vanderlinden's transcribed statement, then 
Judge Cornabyfs transcribed remarks at my 9/27/88 probable cause hearing, plus 
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the cover sheet of my PSI report, and my Objections to Boyce's Report and Recom-
mendation—all showing Judge Sam is willing to use perjury to carry out his part 
in the conspiracy. 
d) The record will show that he believes anyone who objects to being 
sentenced on the PSI report's lying about there was another neighborhood victim 
is really only complaining about its "form and tenor". 
e) The PROOF will further show that my motion to be appointed counsel 
in 
at my 11/17/92 evidentiary hearing was overruledjfdeliberate direct violation of 
28 USC 2254 Rule 8(c). That rule requires I be appointed counsel whether or not 
I request it. 
My ACTUAL INJURY from his 4/27/93 dismissal was 3 months in prison at 
$3500, plus a 14-month deprivation (from 5/7/92) of prison-supplied legal assis-
tance at an arbitrary $1000—totalling to $24,500, I further pray for an 8% 
liability of my suggested $5 million PUNITIVE damages—or $400,000. 
11) ANGELA MICKL0S, Assistant AG, participated in the conspiracy to sus-
pend habeas corpus with her Answer to my R&R Objections wherein I had proved the 
report was based on perjury. She said such an objection was no reason not to 
adopt the magistrate's report. Any law official not involved in the conspiracy 
would have instituted action to bring charges against the perjuror. Also thus 
violated was her responsibility to observe the Rules of Professional Conduct 
requiring her to be a force in "preserving government under law [and] to uphold 
legal process." 
My ACTUAL INJURY for her April 1993 urging the acceptance of perjury was 
three months in prison at $3500—or $10,500. I further pray for a PUNITIVE 
liability of 2%—or $100,000. 
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12) GARY DeLAND, former Corrections Director// 13) LANE McCOTTER, 
present Corrections Director// 14) ELDON BARNES, former Draper warden// 15) 
FRED VAN DER VEUR, Gunnison warden were all crucial participants in the conspiracy 
to create A SUSPENSION OF PRISONERS'' Article I Section 9 Constitutional right to 
habeas corpus review of being in prison on false secret information. Their ac-
tions were thus designed to effectively curtail our First Amendment right to seek 
redress in the courts by denying us the 14th Amendment's equal protection of the 
law as promulgated by the Supreme Court in Bounds v Smith—namely that inmates 
must have available research tools as found in a law library, or the services of 
a contract attorney. Such is deemed necessary to file ind then be able to effec-
tively answer the attorney general's motions to dismiss. 
a) To prevent this mandated assistance from becoming available to 
inmates, both directors, obviously acting under color of state law, selected the 
contract option, but drew it up in such a way as to render it virtually worthless 
in inmate habeas actions. That was to have it worded so the contract attorney 
is forbidden from offering anything beyond the initial filing, thus guaranteeing 
automatic dismissal. 
PROOF will consist of letting the jury hear the Legal Assistance described 
under Scope of Services in the contract attorneys' agreement with the Department 
of Corrections. 
b) The two wardens were enlisted to aid in tnis conspiracy, prooaoly by 
the Attorney General. Their assignment was to assure that any "jailhouse lawyer" 
work would not be submitted in workmanlike fashion by denying inmates access to 
typewriters or copy machines. At Gunnison, for instance, Van Der Veur decreed 
that typewriters would be available for anything other than legal typing, and that 
any legal documents needing copying would need a written request to the contract 
attorney for him to copy on his next weekly or semi-weekly visit, during which 
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wait responses could become overdue. I believe the illegal habeas-buster UCJA 4-
501 allows only five days. 
My PROOF will be to rely initially on the wardens not committing perjury. 
Should there be any denials, I will ask for a list of prison employees so those 
who implemented the policies can be identified and questioned during discovery. 
c) Mr. Van der Veur even distributed a notice that the contract attorney 
would henceforth not be able to even file habeas petitions based on the Foote 
decision which mandated the Parole Board hold due process hearings. Since that 
past deprivation was known to be still happening to every parole applicant, the 
miniscule contract would need huge augmentation to handle the expected flood. 
Evidently Mr. McCotter refused to re-negotiate. 
PROOF will be the contract attorney producing the notice itself, and his 
request the warden notify the inmates, and the absence of any perjury that the 
warden had not- done so. 
My ACTUAL INJURIES are $30,000 from Gary DeLand for my first 30 months 
of denial of legal assistance at an arbitrary $1000 pr month; #30,000 for a similar 
denial from Lane McCotter for my last 30 months; $500 per month for 28 months 
of typewriter denial from Eldon Barnes for a claim of $14,000; and $16,000 for 
32 months of typewriter and copy machine denial from Fred Van Der Veur. 
PUNITIVE may not be justified because they were probably following the 
advice of the attorney General. 
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover which inmates were denied, 
and by whom, professional help, typewriters and copy machines, to be able to 
answer 
effectively the AGfs automatic dismissal motions. 
16) PETE HAUN, former Parole Board Chairman// 17) MICHAEL SIBBETT, 
former member and present chairman, were crucial contributors in the conspiracy 
to have plea bargain inmates serve original-charge punishments. This will be ill-
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ustrated by examining their methods in conducting their parole hearings* 
a) After the Supreme Court said in its Foote decision that the Boardfs 
hearings would henceforth have to grant equivalent due process to that of a typical 
trial/sentencing court because in Utah, the Board, not the court, determines the 
actual length of sentences— both of these defendants willfully disregarded the 
new requirements by continuing to use secret information against the applicants, 
deny them assistance of counsel, refuse to let them confront accusers now heard 
for the first time, and not let them call their own witnesses—all in direct vio-
lation of the 6th Amendment and its 14th Amendment extension. These also represent 
dramatic deprivals of 5th Amendment protections against getting punished without 
having received those due processes. 
b) Accordingly, I was denied parole on the basis of the victim's supposed 
"letter of fear" because my letter requesting discovery had been deemed unworthy 
of even an acknowledgement, thus preventing me from coming prepared with proof of 
her ridiculing such an idea to the PSI investigator. 
PROOF will consist of my letter requesting discovery, Sibbett's transcribed 
remarks at my 7/31/91 parole hearing, the victim's words as set down in the PSI 
report, and a presumed inability on Mr. Haun's part to claim that Sibbect was not 
carrying out his policy. 
My ACTUAL INJURIES were 24 months of further incarceration from Chairman 
Hauny s method of conducting hearings at $3500—or $84,000; and also $84,000 from 
Michael Sibbett for the exact same reasons. 
I furthermore pray for PUNITIVE damages apportioned at 3% of $5 million— 
or $150,000 from Pete Haun; and 4% from Michael Sibbett—or $200,000. 
Th«- CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover every inmate who can determine 
he had damaging false secret infromation used against him at his hearing. 
16. 
18) LORENZO K. MILLER, Assistant A G, entered the conspiracy to suspend 
J- • -i frnffl TnHao T-bbs for the unpreceder.ted-habeas corpus by: a) obtaining a dismissal from Juag. -oos 
ia-the-history-of-the United States reason I had named an innocent warden as de-
dendant. I was thus denied the 14th Amendment's due process and equal protection.;-
i_ • u ,-.-„-. nHsnnpr to name the warden as ' 
of the Utah rules of habeas corpus which require a prisoner to na 
b) He next asked Judge Tibbs to become a 78-55-1 criminal by moving 
that the forbidden UCJA 4-501 be used to dismiss me without a hearing. Mr. Miller 
thereby tried to become an accomplice in the commission of a punishable offense-
seemingly a far cry from his Canon of Ethics "duty to uphold legal process". 
(That the Attorney General allows assistants to become law violators 
is heavy duty evidence how deep this conspiracy is presently embedded in Utah's 
court system .) 
PROOF will be Miller's "argument" about warden defendants submitted with 
no case citations (they did not exist), and 6th District Court records showing his 
illegal UCJA 4-501 dismissal submittal. 
My ACTUAL INJURY was 23 months of further incarceration at $3500— 
or $80,500. 
I furthermore pray for PUNITIVE damages of 7% of my suggested $5 million 
—or $350,000. 
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to examine district court habeas corpus 
records to discover how many times the AG has submitted UCJA 4-501, and which 
judges agreed to participate in this violation of lav. 
19) JUDGE DON TIBBS, Sixth District Court, further participated in the 
conspiracy to suspend habeas corpus by twice ordering my re-filing refused even 
though it now contained the parole board as added defendant as now required for 
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the first time in U.S. History by Sstes v Van Per Veur. 
a) The first refusal violated my 1st Amendment right of access to the 
courts since the denial was solely based on my having directed it to "Circuit" 
court. My original petition had been correctly so headed, but just a month pre-
viously Manti had been elevated to district status—but with no notice having 
been given to Gunnison inmates. So, instead of just having my heading changed 
accordingly, Judge Tibbs ordered it refused with only this cryptic reason: "be-
cause their (sic) is no longer a Sixth Circuit Court in Sanpete County..." No 
suggestion was offered of how I might get it into the right court (which was just 
where he was sitting when he told his clerk to disgrace the Constitution): 
b) He next decided to become an actual law violator by wrongfully refu-
sing a habeas corpus petition (78-35-1) by returning my second re-submittal for 
a "failure" to pay a filing fee. Utah statute 21-7-2(2)(c) strictly forbids such 
a requirement. 
Such willful criminal behavior deprived me of my 14th Amendment right to 
equal protection of the law. 
PROOF will be the jury hearing the statute read and seeing the two filing 
refusals he had the county clerk send me. 
My ACTUAL INJURY was 23 months from his 9/16/91 refusal till my July 28, 
1993 release on parole at $3500 per month—or $80,000. 
I furthermore pray for severe PUNITIVE damages of 9% of my hoped-for $5 
million dollar total—or $450,000. 
20) KIRK T0RGENSEN, Assistant AG, was provably a participant in the 
conspiracy to suspend habeas corpus by the manner he resisted my adding another 
ground to my federal habeas petition #90-C-668-S. I felt my Utah habeas being 
thrown out for ray following Rule 65B and naming the warden as defendant needed to 
be included. His inability to cite any precedent in history except Estes v Van 
18. 
Per Veur 824 P.2d 1200 proves the depths this conspiracy plumbs and reflects his 
involvement in denying petitioners equal protection of the law. 
Even former judges sitting on the Court of Appeals, had to invent that my 
not naming the Parole Board as defendant was the reason Miller and Tibbs used to 
correctly dismiss me—because Lorenzo Miller had not even proffered any such 
argument!—his argument was only that the warden had not personally deprived me of 
any rights. A next logical step for Mr. Torgensen would be to support a dismissal 
because the trial judge was not named as defendant. 
PROOF would be the jury hearing Mr. Torgensen attempting to answer this 
question: "If the AG's role in upholding the law and seeking justice is to oppose 
an apparently legitimate habeas complaint, does it also encompass seeking and/or 
defending a dismissal based on the complaint having followed the governing rule 
when there was no previous case to use as a precedent?" 
No ACTUAL INJURY of additional incarceration can be attributed, but I pray 
for a 4% PUNITIVE punishment—or $200,000. 
The CLASS ACTION aspect would be to discover how many similar victims he or 
other Sixth District judges had so a special prosecutor could bring them to trial. 
NOTE: SHOULD ANY OF THE ABOVE OR FOLLOWING JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS ATTEMPT TO 
CLAIM ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY, THEY WILL HAVE TO OVERCOME IMBLER V PATCHMAN US 47 L.Ed 
128 ON WILLFUL VIOLATIONS UNDER 18 USC 242, SAMUEL V PITT. U 375 F Suppl 119, 
WHITE V FLEMING 374 F Suppl 267, AND BAUERS V HEISEL 361 F. 2d 581. OTHERS' 
CLAIMS OF IMMUNITY WILL FACE HAFER V MELO 112 S Ct 358 WHICH OVERRIDES ANYTHING TO 
THE CONTRARY. 
21) Presiding Judge MICHAEL J. MURPHY, Third District Court, participated 
in the conspiracy to suspend habeas corpus by refusing me my 1st Amendment right of 
access to his court to seek redress of Judge Rigtruprs stating his court is closed 
to habeas complaints about lack of due process at sentencing—a 78-35-1 crime. 
19. 
Instead of allowing the complaint to be filed and receive normal due pro-
cess procedure, he refused it as a "nuisanse filing" saying my filing it might be 
an act punishable by sanctions. That action makes him liable for damages under 18 
USC 242 and 28 UCS 1343 for failure under 42 USC 1986 to prevent further conspira-
torial violations by a fellow district judge, 
PROOF will be his 4/17/92 "sanctions" letter. 
No ACTUAL INJURY of additional incarceration can be attributed, but I pray 
for a PUNITIVE judgement of 4%—or $200,000. 
22) JOHN WAHLQUIST, Sixth District judge, likewise made himself liable 
under 18 USC 242, 28 USC 1343 and 42 USC 1986 when he refused to act to prevent 
further 42 USC 1985 conspiratorial acts by Judge Tibbs by: 
a) Instead of scheduling a trial wherein I could exercise my 1st Amendment 
right to redress the grievance, he chose to schedule a dismissal hearing "on the 
Court's own motion" so certain quite astounding questions could be answered. 
b) Then he cancelled that hearing to instead, ask me and the newly-entered 
Assistant AG Carlson to submit "briefs" just as if there had been^an answer, a trial, 
and a decision that could be appealed. 
PROOF of Judge Wahlquist being an invidious moving force to ensure further 
violations will be having the jury hear.the wording of his "Court's own motion" and 
hear how he tries to answer, explain or elucidate: (1) what precedent was there for 
his making a defense attorney-type motion; (2)
 why a prisoner's failure to get a 
summons served needs a hearing to discover why; (3) show how 78-35-1 designed to 
punish judges could be, or ever has been, used to fine Parole Board members $5000; 
and to let the jury hear just which parts of my complaint were "too ambiguous for-
judge Tibbs to be able to understand. 
Further PROOF will come from the jury hearing why he asked for "briefs^ 
20. 
and why he was able to render a "decision" without JggEEStz receiving one from Mr. 
Carlson; and just how the existence of more than one judge in his district as well 
as there being more than one county could have an effect on Judge Tibbsr learning 
he had been charged with a crime. 
No ACTUAL INJURY of additional time served can be attributed, but I pray 
for a PUNITIVE judgement of 8%—or $400,000. 
23) DAVID CARLSON, Assistant AG, will also be liable under 18 USC 242 and 
28 USC 1343 by not only violating 42 USC 1986 by refusing to apply the state's 
power to prevent further 42 USC 1985 conspiratorial acts as well as criminally-
punishable ones by Judge Tibbs, but actually choosing to become his defense attorney. 
In defending, rather than prosecuting, criminal law violations, and in 
becoming an invidious moving force to ensure further violations, the Office of 
Attorney General brands Utah as an outlaw state. 
PROOF will hinge on whether Mr. Carlson will be able to explain to the 
jury: (a) how a prisoner can, with no law books allowed in the prison library, make 
arrangements to serve the summons; (b) how a judge has absolute immunity from a 
law designed solely to punish judges; (c) by what route or precedent has a case 
ever proceeded to the Court of Appeals absent : _ a charge ever being answered, 
or tried from which an appeal could be taken; (d) show his precedent of the Court 
of Appeals bringing charges and fining a judge the $5000 of statute 78-35-1; (e) 
provide a citation of any appeals court anywhere ever bringing charges (other than 
contempt of court) against anybody. 
No ACTUAL INJURY of additional time served can be attributed, but I pray 
for a stringent PUNITIVE award of 7%—or $350,000. 
THE FOLLOWING TWO DEFENDANTS, while clothed in the authority of state-
derived powers to correct judges' and attorneys' law and ethical violations set 
21. 
forth above, willfully refused to do so. Instead they conspired to come to the 
defense of the practitioners of the conspiracy to suspend habeas review of plea 
bargains being nullified so original-charge sentences can be imposed, 
THAT DEFENSE CONTAINS AN ADMISSION OF GUILT FOR THEIR "CLIENTS", AND THUS 
PROOF OF MY CONSPIRACY CHARGES. IT DID SO BY SAYING SUCH ACTIVITY IS STANDARD 
ETHICAL PRACTICE IN UTAH, 
These defendants also proved their own active participation in the conspiracy 
by going so far as to lie about the content of the laws and rules violated. 
In refusing to confront the perpetrators, but accepting instead no-contest 
admissions of guilt as a foundation for exoneration, these defendants conspired to 
continue as a moving force for further willful violations of Article I Section 9rs 
guarantee of habeas corpus, the First Amendment's guarantee of redress of grievances, 
and continued Utah violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments' guarantees of due 
process. 
This conspiracy has caused a nullification of Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Sections 145 thru 150 that "Judges are to protect the rights of the individual, not 
to conspire to subvert those rights." 
24) DEAN W. SHEFFIELD of the Judicial Conduct Commission, in response to my 
complaints of some of the- violations set forth above: 
a) Said Judge Tibbsf clerk must have acted on her own (but presumably never 
asked her) when my habeas petition was refused for no filing fee, and then lied by 
saying that such petitions jio require the payment of such a fee. 
PROOF will be reading the fee rule and his letters to me dated 5/29/92 and 
9/16/93. 
b) Next, he decided that Judge Sawayafs illegal dismissal using the forbid-
den UCJA Rule 4-501 was not any problem for his commission. 
PROOF will be his 9/16/93 letter Co me and reading the duties of his commis-
sion under the laws of Utah for the jury's consideration. 
22. 
c) He used the same words to dismiss my complaint of Judge Rigtrup's savma 
that his court is closed for habeas consideration of Constitutional violations by a 
sentencing judge—thus suspending habeas corpus, 
PROOF will be the same as in (b) above. 
No ACTUAL INJURY for additional time served but I am praying for a PUNITIVE 
award of 6%—or $300,000. 
25) P. GARY FERRER0 of the Utah State Bar participated in the conspiracy by: 
a) Responding that Dan Larsenfs and Lorenzo Miller's illegal submittals of 
UCJA Rule 4-501, and that LarsenTs tacit admission that he is a part of Utah's sus-
pension of habeas corpus—neither one constituting any evidence of an ethical violation. 
b) He furthermore justified the use of the rule to dismiss habeas petitions 
for it being an "adopted court rule". He thus supplied conclusive proof of the state-
wide conspiracy to suspend habeas corpus review of using secret information to ille-
gally sentence plea bargainers to original-charge terms because Webster defines 
ethical as "conforming to accepted standards of professional conduct." 
PROOF will be my complaint letter of Feb.11, 1993, Mr. Ferrerd1s responses of 
5/3/93 and 6/22/93, plus the jury hearing a reading of Rule 4-501. 
c) Mr. Ferrero additionally conspired to endorse Assistant AG Carlson's 
intervening as defense attorney, rather than prosecutor, to proffer the unbelievable 
claim that Judge Tibbs, being a judge, has absolute immunity from a law solely enacted 
to punish judges. 
PROOF will again be ray cpmplaint letter and the response to it which I don't 
seem to be able to locate. That should not be a problem. 
I claim no ACTUAL INJURY, but pray for a substantial PUNITIVE award of 6% 
of my suggested $5 million total--or $300,000. 
23. 
In view of the reality of this statewide conspiracy to support and defend, 
rather than prosecute, crimes by public officials, I will only state for the record 
that both former governor, NORMAN BANGERTER, and present governor, MICHAEL LEAVITT, 
were both given a full apprisal of the foregoing defense counsel/ AG / judge 
unconstitutional behavior. Both chose, however, to become integral moving forces 
in the conspiracy by not even acknowledging receipt of the information—let alone 
initiating any action to curb further violations. Maybe issue a joinder?? 
BASIS FOR MONETARY DAMAGES AND PUNISHMENT: By reason of the conduct of 
the defendants, or as part of their governmental entity's participation in the con-
spiracy to void plea bargains so original-charge punishments can be imposed with-
out the expense of trials, each one became separately liable the months in prison 
his or her unconstitutional acts caused. In so doing, they deprived me of one, or 
more, or all of the following rights, privileges and immunities secured to me by 
the Constitution of the United States: 
at The right to have habeas corpus procedure open to me under Article I 
Section 9. 
b. The right to petition the courts for redress of grievances under the 
First Amendment. 
c. The right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law 
under the Fifth Amendment. 
d. The right in all liberty-interest proceedings to be informed of the 
nature of the accusations; to confront witnesses against me; to have my own wit-
nesses; and to have assistance of counsel—all under the Sixth Amendment. 
The basis of my claims for actual injury is $2500 per month compensating 
for loss of salary, plus $1000 per month nominal for the mental suffering and 
anguish for being in prison instead of outside on probation, or from a habeas-
ordered re-sentencing, or a new parole hearing. I have put forth amounts based 
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on the comparative negligence or illegal acts of each defendant. 
Furthermore, the acts, conduct and behavior of the defendants were perfor-
med knowingly, intentionally and maliciously which entitles me to an award of 
punitive damages. I have suggested the amount of 5 million dollars to be assessed 
according to the apparent willful misconduct and to the resulting damage to me or 
justice under law. 
Whatever the final amount of all damages awarded, I hereby pledge all 
monies over $750,000 to create a class action remedy fund to get relief for the 
hundreds, or thousands of past and present inmates who were incarcerated and/or 
denied parole because of false unchallenged secret information; and for all who 
were denied habeas corpus hearings through illegal or unconstitutional court pro-
cedure; or were unable to pursue such actions because of the absence of prison law 
libraries or crippling restrictions deliberately imposed on contract attorneys. 
On the off-chance the perpetrators try to avoid responsibility for their 
illegal/unethical conspiratorial acts with an answer of mootness, lack of standing 
behind 
or statute of limitations because I am no longer,ibars, I now reply with the pre-
emptive fact that my "freedom" can be ended without even the benefit of a hearing 
should I be seen drinking beer, or visiting my adoring grandkids without a parent 
present, cook with wine, or go hiking on Wheeler Peak ,Nev. etc., etc. 
And the decision would rest with defendant Michael Sibbett. 
Furthermore, I ask this Court for acknowlegement of Utah precept as set 
forth in Jensen v. DeLand Ut S. Ct. 870107 and Martinez v. Smith 602 P.2d 700/702 
that "to dismiss should be regarded as admission of allegations to be true. 
Judge should
 not cater to prosecution [here as defendants] whim but proceed to 
determine the facts." 
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Preliminary to my listing of my previous related court actions and mv 
prayer for relief, I now quote Article I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. For 
five years I have been deprived of this fundamental guarantee of a civilized way 
to redress wrongs by the very public servants who have sworn to uphold the effi-
cacy and regular adherence to its provisions: 
Courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury to him in his person, property or reputation, 
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall 
be administered without denial or unneccessary delay." 
PREVIOUS RELATED LAWSUITS 
If any defendant challenges the existence of conspiracy, he need first 
proffer a logical explanation how the following actions were, in five years, 
unable to bring about their one purpose: a hearing where I would be allowed to 
show ineffectiveness of counsel had Judge Cornaby sentence me as a dangerous 
repeat offender from deliberate PSI report lies I never got to expose; or one 
where I could challenge similar unconstitutional Parole Board actions. 
Absent such explanations for this unprecedented list, defenses should 
accordingly be regarded as mere technical evasions in keeping with the foregoing 
illegal and/or unconstitutional actions made to avoid uncovering the root purpose 
of nullifying plea bargains to get original-charge punishments without the cost 
of trials or habeas corpus exposure of that conspiracy: 
ACTION 
Mot.for Stray Execut. 
Cert. Probable Cause 
Mot. Withdr. Plea 
COURT 
2nd Dist. 
Ut. Su. Ct. 
2nd Dist. 
CASE # 
5983 
880279 
5983 ! 
DATE 
7/28/88 
8/1/88 
12/14/85 
PARTIES 
Utah v. Estes 
Utah v. Estes 
Utah v. Estes 
f 
_Jl 
Cor 
Cor 
j JUDGE j OUTCOME 
[Cornaby j Denied 
Denied 
J 
i 
nabv j Denied 
i 
26. 
Writ Habeas Corpus 
Cert. Probable Cause 
New Cert. Prob. Caus 
Appeal Trial (senten 
Certiorari 
Writ Habeas Corpus 3rd District 
IT Sup. Ct. 
2nd Dist. 
OT Sup. Ct. 
UT Sup. Ct. 
Ct.of Appls 
UT Sup. Ct. 
Appeal Dismissal 
Second Habeas Corpus 
Enforce Right to HC 
Hearing 
Appeal H.C. DismissaJJ 
Certiorari 
28 USC 2254 H.C. 
Appeal 2254 Dismissal) 
Writ Habeas Corpus 
28 USC 2254 remanded 
after exhaustion 
Appeal of 2254 Dism. 
42 USC 1983 
Appeal of 1983 Disml 
Certiorari 
Petition to Re-hear 
Writ Habeas Corpus 
UT Sup. Ct. 
3rd District 
UT Sup. Ct. 
Ct. of Appl, 
UT Sup. Ct. 
U.S. Dist. 
U.S. 10th 
Circuit 
U.S. Supr Ct] 
U.S. Distr. 
U.S. 10th Crl 
U.S. Distr. 
US 10th Circl 
US Supr. Ct 
US Supr. Ct 
6th Discrictj 
880279 
880329 
5983 
880279 
880279 
890272 
890271 
9/8/88 
9/20/88 
Esces v. Warcei 
Utah v. Estes 
12/31/88Utah v. Estes 
900901219 
90015 
900903466 
?7 
900418 
900418 
90-C-0668 
91-4091 i 
92-5034 
90-C-668 
93-4086 
92-C-223 
92-4087 
92-6557 
92-6557 
9947 
4/17/89 
1/3/90 
1/29/90 
4/7/90 
6/2/90 
7/27/90 
4/1/91 
Utah v. Estes 
Utah v. Estes 
Estes v Warden 
Estes v Warden 
Estes v Warden 
Estes v Warden 
Estes v Warden 
Cornabv 
10/24/91IEstes v Warden 
Estes v Wardeni Sam 
Rigtrup 
Sawaya 
9/10/90 
4/1/91 [Estes v Warden* 
1 !* 
10/15/92 
2/12/92 
5/?/93 
2/2/92 
6/5/92 
11/10/92 
1/25/93 
8/5/91 
Estes v Warden) 
Van Der Veur 
Estes v Warden! Sam 
Estes v Warden! 
Estes v Deot. I Sam 
Corrections 
ditto 
ditto 
ditto 
Estesv Warden] Tibbs 
Van Der veur 
Dismissed 
Denied 
Denied 
Confirmed 
Denied 
Dismissed 
Confirmed 
Dismissed z 
UCJA 4-5C 
Denied 
Confirmed 
Denied 
Dismissed : 
non-exhaus 
Confirmed 
Denied 
Dismissed 
Confirmed 
Dismissed 
Confirmed 
Denied 
Denied 
Dismissed 
27. 
Appeal of H.C. Disml 
Certiorari 
Re-subm w/added def 
Habeas Corpus 
Appeal of H.C. Disml 
Certiorari 
78-35-1 Complaint 
UT S Ct/App 
UT Supr Ct. 
6th District! 
Appeals Crt 
UT Supr Ct 
910613-CA 
92103 
9/30/91 
2/3/92 
920600157 1/31/92 
930083-CA 
930348 
6th District} 920600148 
2/4/93 
3/3/92 
ditto 
ditto 
Estes v Van Dejr. 
Vuer & Bd Pardj 
ditto 
ditto 
3/23/92 Estes v Tibbs 
6/7/92 f 
Mower 
Confirmed 
Denied 
Dismissed 
Confirmed 
Mooted (pa: 
Wahlauist Dismissed 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Therefore, I, the plaintiff, Newton C. Estes, pray that the defendants 
each be cited to answer this complaint, and that plaintiff have judgement for 
the actual damages I have set forth above, and for the further sum of $5,000,000 
exemplary punitive damages from eighteen or more of them on account of their 
malfeasance or malice, and the costs of this civil rights suit and other general 
and equitable relief. Or as otherwise decided by the jury. 
Respectfully submitted on thi 13 12 ti. 
_day of July, 1994. 
Newton C. Estes 
The undersigned declares under penalty of perjury that the information 
contained herein is true and correct- (As to be proved by the record of the above. 
30 court actions) 
Tl^^Crv- C r-it^ 
Newton C. Estes 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING: I hereby certify that, in accordance with Magistrate 
28. 
Alba's advice on how to proceed, I mailed a copv of this Amended Civil Rights 
Complaint on -this / a day of July, 1994 to these Defendants who were previously 
served a copy with summons requiring an answer in 20 days, or mailed a Waiver 
of Service for Summons request requiring an answer within 60 days of that June 
20 mailing. Presumably receipt of all answers now become due 20 days after this 
mailing plus 3 days for delivery to defendant, plus another 3 days for delivery 
to me and the Court from defendant: (1) Brian Namba, Deputy Davis County Attorney 
P.O. Box 618, Farmington, UT 84025; (2) Steve Vanderlinden, C/0 Dennis Day (guar-
dian), 2218 N 1300 W, Clinton, UT 84015; (3) Judy Valeika, Adult Probation & 
Parole, P.O. Box 700, Farmington, UT 84025; (4) Judge Douglas Cornaby, 3612 N 
2900 E, Layton, UT 84040; (5) Jay Edmonds, 1660 Orchard Drive, Salt Lake City, UT 
84106; (6) Dan R. Larsen, Asst. Utah Attorney General, 330 S 300 E, Salt Lake 
City UT 84111; (7) Judge Kenneth Rigtrup, Third District Court, 240 E 400 S, 
Salt Lake City UT 84111; (8) Judge James Sawaya, 683 E 4800 S, Murray, UT 84107; 
(9) Craig Ludwig, Clerk of the Court, Third Distrcit Court, 240 E 400 S, Salt 
Lake City UT 84111; (10) Judge David Sam, United States District Court, 350 South 
Main St., Salt Lake City UT 84101; (11) Angela Micklos, Asst. Utah Attorney 
General, 124 State Capitol, Salt Lake City UT 84114; (12) Gary De Land, P.O.Box 
579, Santa Clara, UT 84765; (13) Lane McCotter, c/o Utah Dept. of Corrections, 
6100 S 300 E, #400, Murray, UT 84107; (14) Eldon Barnes, 986 Granite Peak Drive, 
Sandy, UT 84094; (15) Warden Fred Van Der Veur, Central Utah Correctional Faci-
lity, Gunnison, UT 84634; (16) Pete Haun, c/o Utah Board of Pardons, 448 East 
6400 South #300, Murray, UT 84107; (17) Michael Sibbett, c/o Utah Board of 
Pardons, 448 E 6400 S #300, Murray, UT 84107; (18) Lorenzo K. Miller, Asst. 
Utah Attorney General, 330 S 300 E, Salt Lake City, UT 84111; (19) Judge Don 
Tibbs, Sixth District Court, 160 North Main Street, Manci, UT 84642; (20) Kirk 
29. 
M. Torgensen, Asst. Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84114; (21) Judge Michael Murphy, Third District Court, 240 E 400 S, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84111; (22) Judge John Wahlquist, 25 Amistad, Irvine, CA 92720; 
(23) David M. Carlson, Asst. Utah Attorney General, 330 S 300 E, Salt Lake City, 
UT 84111; (24) Dean W. Sheffield, c/o Judicial Conduct Commission, 3760 High-
land Drive, #246, Salt Lake City, UT 84106; (25) P. Gary Ferrero, c/o Utah State 
Bar, 645 S 200 E, #205, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
Newton C. Estes 
372 E 700 N 
Kaysville, UT 84037 
Phone: 801/544-5253 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE"DISTRICT OF UTAH 
• : : • / . • - , . . 
NORTHERN DI VIS ION_ _^ ' ^ y 
FEB 1 3 1995 
NEWTON C. ESTES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN NAMBA, et al. , ] 
Defendants. ] 
1 Case No. 94-NC-089 W 
1 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 
Plaintiff, Newton C. Estes, commenced this action on June 
17, 1994, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and 1986, claiming 
constitutional violations arising out of an alleged conspiracy 
among the twenty-five named defendants "to nullify plea bargains 
by suspending habeas corpus review of courtroom victims receiving 
original-charge punishments through the use of false secret 
information by the sentencing judge and parole board." (Compl. 
at 2, File Entry #1; Am. Compl. at 2, File Entry # 3 0.) 
The individuals named in the plaintiffs complaint include 
the following non-state employees as defendants: Brian Namba, 
Davis County Prosecutor; Steve Vanderlinden, defense attorney and 
public defender; Jay Edmonds, attorney; Dean Sheffield, Judicial 
Conduct Commission; Gary Ferraro, Utah State Bar; and United 
States District Court Judge David Sam. Additionally, the 
following individuals employed by the State of Utah (collectively 
referred to as the "state defendants") were named: Judy Valeika, 
Adult Probation and Parole investigator; The Honorable Douglas 
Cornaby; Dan Larsen, Assistant Attorney General; The Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup; The Honorable James Sawava; Craig Ludwig, Third 
District Court Clerk; Angela Micklos, Assistant Attorney General; 
Gary DeLand, former director of Department of Corrections; 0. 
Lane McCotter, director of Department of Corrections; Eldon 
Barnes, former warden at Utah State Prison; Fred Vanderveur, 
warden at Gunnison Correctional Facility; Pete Haun, former 
chairman of Parole Board; Michael Sibbett, chairman of Parole 
Board; Lorenzo Miller, Assistant Attorney General; The Honorable 
Don Tibbs; Kirk Torgensen-,-Assistant Attorney General; The 
Honorable Michael Murphy; The Honorable John Walhquist; and David 
Carlson, Assistant Attorney General. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The case was assigned to United States District Judge David 
K. Winder, who subsequently referred the matter to the magistrate 
n 
judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (B) . The case was then 
assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba. 
On June 24, 1994, the magistrate judge ordered the plaintiff 
to file an amended complaint, due to the fact that the vague and 
conclusory allegations contained in the original complaint failed 
to state a claim. (File Entry #24.) The plaintiff filed his 
amended complaint on July 18, 1994. (File Entry #30.) 
Motions to Dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint, 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P, 12(b)(6), were filed by or on behalf 
of all of the defendants (except Steve Vanderlinden1) , along with 
supporting memoranda. (File Entries #33-Edmonds, #35-Sheffield, 
#37-Namba, #42-Ferraro, #45-all state defendants, and #58-Sam.) 
lA motion to quash attempted service of process on Mr. 
Vanderlinden was filed by Michael Nielsen, by special appearance, 
on July 8, 1994. (File Entry #28.) The magistrate judge granted 
the motion on August 1, 1994, finding that due to defendant 
Vanderlinden's present incapacity, plaintiff had not complied 
with the service requirements set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(g) 
and Utah R. Civ. P. 4(e)(3). (File Entry #32.) Plaintiff again 
attempted service of process on Mr. Vanderlinden through Mr. 
Nielsen. (File Entry #40.) Mr. Nielsen subsequently advised the 
court that he is unable to accept service of process because he 
is not the guardian or conservator of Mr. Vanderlinden. (File 
Entry #52.) At the hearing on the other defendants' motions to 
dismiss, plaintiff agreed to withdraw his claims against Mr. 
Vanderlinden. Accordingly, this Court recommends that all claims 
against Mr. Vanderlinden be dismissed with prejudice. 
3 
The plaintiff filed responses to the defendants' motions (File 
Entries #48-51, 56 and 60), to which the defendants replied (File 
Entries #54-Edmonds, #55-Ferraro, #65-state defendants, and #67-
Sam) . Additionally, plaintiff filed a "Motion to Not Allow 
Atterney [sic] General to Engage in Federal Courtroom 
Racketeering by Representing Judicial Defendants; and 
Disqualification from Representing other Defendants." (File 
Entry #44.) The state defendants filed a memorandum in 
opposition to the plaintiff's motion. (File Entry ^6G.) At the 
hearing on the motions to dismiss, the plaintiff withdrew the 
above motion. (File Entry #69.) 
A hearing on the defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's 
amended complaint was held before the magistrate judge on 
September 19, 1994. The Court heard oral arguments from the 
plaintiff, pro se; Gerald Hess, for defendant Namba; Jay Edmonds, 
pro se; Stephen Sorenson, Assistant United States Attorney, for 
defendant Judge Sam; Carman Kipp and Kirk Gibbs, for defendant 
Ferrero; Dean Sheffield, pro se; and Mark Shurtleff, Assistant 
Attorney General, for the state defendants. Plaintiff orally 
requested leave to file a second amended complaint, which the 
4 
Court denied. Additionally, the plaintiff was notified that the 
Court will recommend that sanctions be imposed on the plaintiff, 
under Fed. R. Civ. P. n , should the plaintiff seek to amend his 
complaint in the future without remedying the pleading 
deficiencies as to the conspiracy claim. 
After a thorough review of all pleadings and consideration 
of the oral arguments presented at the hearing on the motions to 
dismiss, the Court issues the following Report and 
Recommendation. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2 
Plaintiff's alleged web of conspiracy begins when he was 
arraigned on a criminal matter in Utah State Court in January of 
1988. Plaintiff describes the ''conspiracy" as follows: 
a conspiracy to nullify plea bargains by 
suspending habeas corpus review of courtroom 
victims receiving original-charge punishments 
through the use of false secret information 
by the sentencing judge and parole board. 
The purpose is to achieve the same result 
without the cost of a trial. 
:The facts set forth below are based solely on the 
allegations made in the plaintiff's amended complaint, and are 
presumed to be true only for purposes of this 12(b)(6) motion. 
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(Am. Compl. at l.)3 
Defendant Namba was the prosecuting attorney at the 
arraignment. (Am. Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that he asked 
Namba to recommend an attorney and was given defendant Steve 
Vanderlinden7s name. (Id.) Defendant Vanderlinden represented 
plaintiff in the criminal matter. (Am. Compl. at 3.) 
At some point in either June or July of 1988, plaintiff pled 
guilty in the criminal action. Plaintiff alleges that, in 
connection with his guilty plea, Vanderlinden tried to get him to 
sign an affidavit dated June 21, 1988, that contained admissions 
concerning the original criminal charges brought against the 
plaintiff. (Am. Comp. at 3.) Plaintiff attributes authorship of 
this affidavit to defendant Namba. (Am. Compl. at 2.) 
In connection with the plaintiff's sentencing in July of 
1988, plaintiff claims that Vanderlinden did not obtain 
plaintiff's presentence report until 20 minutes before the 
2The plaintiff spins each of the named defendants into the 
alleged web of conspiracy by attributing their involvement in che 
proceedings subsequent to the plaintiff's plea bargain and 
sentencing in July of 1988, as somehow connected with the 
conspiracy. This is accomplished by making broad and conclusory 
allegations that a particular defendant's actions, in some 
unspecified way, manifest involvement in a conspiracy against the 
plaintiff. 
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sentencing hearing. (Am. Comp. at 3.) Plaintiff further alleges 
that the presentence report was very lengthy and filled with 
lies. According to the plaintiff, Vanderlinden did not review 
the report nor did he challenge the contents at the hearing. As 
a result plaintiff alleges that he was sentenced as a "dangerous 
repeat offender." (Am. Compl. at 3-4.) 
Plaintiff also claims that Vanderlinden perjured himself at 
a hearing on November 17, 1992, before United States Magistrate 
Judge Ronald Boyce, concerning plaintiff's federal habeas 
petition. Plaintiff alleges that Vanderlinden testified that the 
presentence reports are not available to defendants until just 
before sentencing. (Am. Compl. at 4. ) Additionally, plaintiff 
claims that Vanderlinden allowed Namba to present negative 
evidence against plaintiff to the sentencing judge outside of the 
plaintiff's presence. (Am. Compl. at 4-5.) 
Defendant Judy Valeika was the Adult Probation and Parole 
investigator tasked with preparing plaintiff's presentence 
report. Plaintiff alleges that the report contained lies and 
unconfirmed rumors. (Am. Compl. at 5-6.) Plaintiff also claims 
that Valeika told him that he was not allowed to see his 
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presentence report. (Am. Compl. at 5.) 
Judge Douglas Cornaby, of the Second District Court for the 
State of Utah, sentenced the plaintiff in the underlying criminal 
matter. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Cornaby sentenced him as a 
"high risk offender with deep-seated sexual problems/' despite 
plaintiff's professions that the presentence report contained 
lies and false rumors. (Am. Compl. at 6-7.) Judge Cornaby also 
denied plaintiff's motion to withdraw his plea. (Am. Compl. at 
25.) 
Defendant Jay Edmonds handled plaintiff's appeal. (Am. 
Compl. at 7.) Plaintiff claims that Edmonds failed to raise 
Vanderlinden's ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for 
appeal. (Am. Compl. at 7.) 
Defendant Dan Larsen, Assistant Attorney General, 
represented the state's interest in connection with two of 
plaintiff's habeas corpus petitions (#900901219 and #900903466). 
(Am. Compl. at 8.) The first petition was dismissed by Judge 
Kenneth Rigtrup, of the Third District Court for the State of 
Utah, (Am. Compl. at 8-9, 26), while the second one was dismissed 
by Third District Court Judge James Sawaya, pursuant to "UCJA 4-
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501." (Am. Compl. at 9, 26.) 
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Craig Ludwig, Clerk for the 
Third District Court, State of Utah, failed to mail notification 
to the plaintiff of the "two dismissal hearings" that took place 
before Judge Rigtrup in case #900901219. (Am. Compl. at 10.) 
At some point during 1990, plaintiff filed a 28 U.S.C. § 
2254 petition (90-C-0668) in the United States District Court for 
the District of Utah. The case was assigned to United States 
District Court Judge David Sam, who dismissed the petition upon 
the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge 
Ronald Boyce. (Am. Compl. at 11-12, 26.) Plaintiff alleges that 
the dismissal was primarily based on the uperjur[ed]" testimony 
of Vanderlinden and that in his objection to the Report and 
Recommendation, he provided Judge Sam with proof of the perjury. 
(Am. Compl. at 11-12.) Plaintiff also alleges that -de-f endant 
Angela Micklos, Assistant Attorney General, filed an answer to 
plaintiff's objection to the Report and Recommendation urging the 
court to adopt it. Plaintiff claims that Micklos violated the 
Rules of Professional Conduct in failing to institute proceedings 
against Mr. Vanderlinden, the alleged perjuror. (Am. Compl. at 
9 
12.) Plaintiff complains that Kirk Torgensen, Assistant Attorney 
General, participated in the Conspiracy" when he "resisted" the 
plaintiff's attempt to add another ground to his petition. (Am. 
Compl. at 17-18.) 
In 1992, plaintiff filed a second action in the United 
States District Cburt pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (92-C-223) , 
alleging constitutional violations concerning his access to legal 
materials or contract attorneys, and denial of a typewriter and 
copy machine. The case was again assigned to Judge Sam and 
subsequently dismissed prior to service of process on the named 
defendants. (Am. Compl. at 10-11, 26.) 
Plaintiff alleges that defendants Gary DeLand, Lane 
McCotter, Eldon Barnes and Fred Van Der Veur, all associated with 
the Department of Corrections, participated in the alleged 
conspiracy to suspend prisoners' habeas corpus review by 
selecting the "contract attorney option" for providing legal 
services to inmates and by denying inmates access to typewriters 
or copy machines. (Am. Compl. at 13-14.) 
Plaintiff alleges that defendants Pete Haun and Michael 
Sibbett, parole board members, violated plaintiff's 
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constitutional rights during his parole hearing when they denied 
him parole. Plaintiff alleges that Haun and Sibbett used "secret 
information" against him, denied him assistance of counsel, 
refused to let plaintiff confront his accusers, and did not let 
plaintiff call his own witnesses. (Am. Compl• at 15.) 
Defendant Lorenzo Miller, Assistant Attorney General, 
represented the state in connection with another habeas corpus 
petition filed (#9947). Plaintiff alleges that defendant Miller 
obtained a dismissal of the petition from Sixth District Court 
Judge Don Tibbs on the basis that he had "named an innocent 
warden" and pursuant to "UCJA 4-501." (Am. Compl. at 16.) 
Plaintiff also complains that Judge Tibbs wrongfully refused the 
refiling of plaintiff's petition on the grounds that it was 
directed to the wrong court and plaintiff failed to pay a filing 
fee. (Am. Compl. at 17.) 
Plaintiff claims that defendant Third District Court Judge 
Michael Murphy participated in the "conspiracy" when he refused 
the filing of a civil complaint by plaintiff in Utah state court 
against Judge Rigtrup, characterizing it as a "nuisance filing" 
and threatening sanctions. (Am. Compl. at 19.) Plaintiff 
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alleges similar actions by defendant Sixth District Court Judge 
John Wahlquist when he refused to act to prevent "further 
conspiratorial acts by Judge Tibbs." (Am. Compl. at 19-20.) 
Plaintiff also alleges that defendant David Carlson, Assistant 
Atorney General, participated in the "conspiracy" when he chose 
to defend Judge Tibbs, instead of prosecuting him. (Am. Compl. 
at 20.) 
Defendant Dean Sheffield's alleged connection to the 
"conspiracy" stems from his role on the Judicial Conduct 
Commission, where he refused to discipline Judges Tibbs, Sawaya 
and Rigtrup for their actions. (Am. Compl. at 21-22. 
Defendant Gary Ferrero, of the Utah State Bar, is allegedly 
connected to the "conspiracy" as a result of his failure to 
censure Assistant Attorneys General Larsen and Miller for their 
actions concerning his various habeas corpus petitions, and 
Assistant Attorney General Carlson for his role as defense 
attorney for Judge Tibbs. (Am. Compl. at 22.) 
Following the plaintiff's guilty plea and sentencing for the 
underlying criminal action, plaintiff filed an appeal. 
Plaintiff's conviction was affirmed on or about April 17, 1989. 
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(Am. Comp. at 25-25.) During the period of 1990 through 1992, 
plaintiff filed three habeas corpus petitions in Utah State Court 
(#900901219, #900903466, and #9947, resubmitted as #920600157). 
All of these petitions were dismissed. Plaintiff exercised his 
right to appeal, and the dismissals were affirmed. (Am. Compl. 
at 26-27.) In 1990 and Plaintiff filed a habeas corpus petition, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, which was subsequently dismissed and 
affirmed upon appeal to the Tenth Circuit. (Am. Compl. at 26.) 
In 1992, plaintiff filed a civil rights action pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, which was subsequently dismissed and affirmed 
upon appeal to the Tenth Circuit. (Am. Comp. at 26.) In 1992, 
plaintiff filed a complaint against Judge Tibbs in the Sixth 
District Court for the State of Utah, which was dismissed. (Am. 
Compl. at 27.) 
STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL 
PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) 
Rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides a mechanism for dismissal of a complaint where the 
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plaintiff fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted." In reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint, a court 
"presumes all of plaintiff's factual allegations are true and 
construes them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." 
E,g, , Hall v. Bellmon. 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1991). 
Where a complaint has been filed by a pro se litigant, the court 
should construe the complaint liberally and hold it to a "less 
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." 
IsL. at 1110 (citing Haines v. Kerner. 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 
(1972)) . The Tenth Circuit has interpreted this rule to mean 
that if "the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a 
valid claim on which the plaintiff could pre\rail, it should do so 
despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, 
his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and 
sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with pleading 
requirements." Id. 
In requiring a broad reading of a pro se plaintiff's 
complaint, however, the plaintiff is not relieved of the burden 
of alleging "sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim 
could be based." Id. "[C]onclusory allegations without 
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supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on 
which relief can be based." Id. (citing Dunn v. White. 880 F.2d 
1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989), ££TJL. denied. 493 U.S. 1059, 110 
S.Ct. 871 (1990); Sooner Products Cn v. MrBride. 708 F.2d 510, 
512 (10th Cir. 1983); Clulnw v. Oklahoma. 700 F.2d 1291, 1303 
(10th Cir. 1983) , overruled, o_Q other grounds sub. nam, Garcia v, 
Wilson. 731 F.2d 640 (10th Cir: 1984), aff'd. 471 U.S. 261 
(1985) ,- Lorraine v. United States. 444 F.2d 1, 2 (10th Cir. 
1971)) . "Moreover, in analyzing the sufficiency of the 
plaintiff's complaint, the court need accept as true only the 
plaintiff's well-pleaded factual contentions, not his conclusory 
allegations." Hall. 935 F.2d at 1110 (citing Dunn. 880 F.2d at 
1190) . 
DISCUSSION 
The defendants raise numerous grounds in arguing that 
plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Defendants first argue that since 
plaintiff's § 1983 claim is grounded on the alleged illegality 
surrounding plaintiff's criminal conviction and sentence, the 
recent Supreme Court case of Heck v. Humphrey. 114 S.Ct. 2264 
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(1994), bars such a claim absent a showing that the plaintiff's 
conviction or sentence was invalidated. Defendants next attack 
the sufficiency of the facts alleged in connection with the 
plaintiff's §§ 1985 and 1986 claims, arguing that the plaintiff 
failed to allege a prima facie case of discrimination or 
conspiracy. Additional bases for dismissal relied upon by the 
defendants include absolute and qualified or "good faith" 
immunity. Defendant Edmonds argues that his status as 
plaintiff's appeals attorney does not make him a "state actor" 
for purposes of § 1983 liability. Finally, several of the 
defendants raise statute of limitations, service of process and 
Eleventh Amendment issues in support of dismissal. 
I. Cognizability of 5 1983 Claim Based on Illegality of 
Plaintiff's Conviction. Sentence or Incarceration. 
The defendants urge the court to dismiss the plaintiff's 
§1983 claim based on the recent Supreme Court ruling in Heck v. 
Humphrey. 114 S.Ct. 2364 (1994). In Heck, the Court considered 
the cognizability of a § 1983 claim seeking damages for an 
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment. 
Recognizing the need for finality and consistency in criminal 
proceedings, the Court held that; 
16 
in order to recover damages for allegedly 
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, 
or for other harm caused by actions whose 
unlawfulness would render a conviction or 
sentence invalid, [footnote omitted] a § 1983 
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or 
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, 
expunged by executive order, declared invalid 
by a state tribunal authorized to make such 
determination, or called into question by a 
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas 
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for 
damages bearing that relationship to a 
conviction or sentence that has not been so 
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983, 
Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in 
a § 1983 suit, the district court must 
consider whether a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff would necessarily imply the 
invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if 
it would, the complaint must be dismissed 
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the 
conviction or sentence has already been 
invalidated. 
Id. at 2372 (emphasis supplied). 
In the case at hand, the basis of plaintiff's § 1983 claim 
centers on the plea bargain and sentencing aspect of plaintiff's 
underlying criminal conviction, alleging a widespread conspiracy 
among the numerous defendants. Unquestionably, a judgment in 
favor of plaintiff's § 1983 claim would necessarily imply that 
plaintiff's sentence was invalid. Under the precedent 
established in Heck, the plaintiff does not have a cognizable 
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action under § 1983 unless he can show that his sentence has 
already been invalidated. Based on a review of the plaintiff's 
complaint, it is clear that despite the numerous attempts to 
collaterally attack his state court sentence, the plaintiff's 
sentence has not been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by 
executive order or declared invalid. Thus, the plaintiff does 
not have a cognizable action under § 1983 and this claim should 
be dismissed. Heck. 114 S.Ct. at 2372. 
II. Sufficiency of the Allegations Under 42 U.S.C. 55 1985 and 
There are three subsections to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, which 
provide remedies for injuries or deprivation arising out of a 
conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. Subsections (1) and 
(2) are not applicable to the facts alleged by the plaintiff.4 
The remaining subsection (3) appears to be most closely related 
4Subsection (1) of § 1985 provides a cause of action where 
an alleged conspiracy has prevented a person from taking federal 
office or prevented a federal official from discharging his or 
her official duties. The plaintiff in the instant case is a 
private citizen and has not made any allegations that he has been 
prevented from taking a federal office. Subsection (2) concerns 
the intimidation of participants in federal court from testifying 
in court or injury to such participants for having so testified. 
Plaintiff has not alleged any acts of intimidation or injury in 
connection with testimony at a federal court proceeding. Thus, 
plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1985(1) or (2). 
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to the allegations set forth in the plaintiff's complaint. 
Section 1985(3) provides in pertinent part: 
If two or more persons . . . conspire . . . 
for the purpose of depriving . . . any person 
. . . of the equal protection of the laws, or 
of equal privileges and immunities under the 
laws; . . . [or] cause to be done, any act in 
furtherance of the object of such conspiracy 
. . . the party so injured or deprived may 
have an action for the recovery of 
damages.... 
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994). 
In order to state a cause of action under § 1985(3), the 
plaintiff must allege four essential elements: Ml) a conspiracy; 
(2) to deprive plaintiff of equal protection or equal privileges 
and immunities; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and 
(4) an injury or deprivation resulting therefrom." Tilton v. 
Richardson. 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing flriffin v. 
Breckinridge. 403 U.S. 88, 102-103 (1971)), cert, denied, 114 
S.Ct. 925 (1994); Seamons v. Snow. 864 F. Supp. 1111, 1123 (D. 
Utah 1994) ; Taylor v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 661 F. Supp. 
1341, 1345 (N.D.Tex. 1986) . Defendants argue that the 
plaintiff's complaint fails to sufficiently allege the foregoing 
essential elements and, therefore, fails to state a claim under 
19 
§1985. This Court agrees. A broad reading of the allegations 
contained in the plaintiff's amended complaint reveals that it is 
deficient, in several respects, and does not support of a cause 
of action under § 1985. 
First, it is clearly established that broad, conclusory 
allegations of a conspiracy to violate civil rights are 
insufficient to support such a claim. Taylor, 661 F. Supp. at 
1345; Martin v. Delaware Law School of Widener University. 625 F. 
Supp. 1288, 1297 (D.Del. 1985), cert, denied. 493 U.S. 966 
(1989) . Rather, a plaintiff must plead specific, admissible 
facts "supporting an inference that Defendants reached a 'meeting 
of the minds.'" Seamcns. 864 F. Supp. at 1123; see Qallegos v. 
City and County of Denver, 984 F.2d 358, 364 doth cir. 1993), 
Cert, denied. 113 S.Ct. 2962 (1993); Tavlor. 661 F. Supp. at 
1345; Margin. 625 F. Supp. at 1297. It is not enough to show 
merely that the defendants had a common goal or acted in concert. 
Martin. 625 F. Supp. at 1297. In the instant case, the plaintiff 
makes broad and conclusory allegations of a wide-spread 
conspiracy among the named defendants, yet provides no specific 
or admissible facts identifying how the defendants came to an 
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agreement to act in concert to deprive the plaintiff of his 
constitutional rights. 
Another significant pleading deficiency relating to 
plaintiff's § 1985 claim concerns the second element set forth 
above, which requires that the plaintiff show that the conspiracy 
was formed for the purpose of depriving the plaintiff of "equal 
protection or equal privileges and immunities." Tilton, 6 F.3d 
at 686. Focusing on the "equal protection or equal privileges 
and immunities" language contained in § 1985(3), the Supreme 
Court in Griffen v. Breckenridge. 403 U.S. at 101-102, held that 
§1985(3) does not "apply to all tortious, conspiratorial 
interferences with the rights of others," but rather, only to 
conspiracies motivated by "some racial, or perhaps otherwise 
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus." Id.: Bisbee v, 
Bey. 39 F.3d 1096, 1102 (10th Cir. 1994); Tilton. 6 F.3d-at 686; 
Silkwood v. Kerr-Mrflee Corp.. 637 F.2d 743, 748 (10th Cir. 1980), 
cerr . d£ni££, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); H^r.nn v. Galetka, 799 F. 
Supp. 1129, 1131 (D. Utah 1992). The "other 'class-based 
animus'" language of this requirement has been narrowly construed 
and does not, for example, reach conspiracies motivated by an 
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economic or commercial bias." Tilton 6 F.3d at 68 6. "In fact, 
the Supreme Court has held that 'it is a close question whether 
§1985(3) was intended to reach any class-based animus other than 
animus against Negroes and those who championed their case.'" Id. 
(quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America. Local 
610. AFL-CTO v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837 (1983)). 
It is clear from the plaintiff's complaint that he is not 
claiming that the conspiracy was movitated by some race based 
discriminatory animus. Thus, that leaves the question of whether 
plaintiff has alleged facts supporting a class-based 
discriminatory purpose. A class of individuals that is 
"suffering from [a] discriminatory animus must be comprised of 
members defined by immutable characteristics for which the 
members of the alleged class have no responsibility, e.g., racial 
or sexual characteristics." Taylor. 661 F. Supp. at 1347; s^SL 
Silkwood. 637 F.2d at 747 (no class-based animus directed toward 
group "which did not tend to exist prior to the occurrence of the 
events set forth in the complaint and which [tended] to be 
defined by one particular activity or by plaintiff's individual 
situation") . Here, plaintiff contends that he is a member of a 
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class of uplea bargainers'' who have been discriminated against as 
a result of a "conspiracy." The Court finds, however, that for 
purposes of § 1985 liability, uplea bargainers" are not a 
protected class of individuals with characteristics not 
susceptible to change, and for which the members of the alleged 
class have no responsibility. While criminal defendants who 
choose to enter into a plea agreement may find themselves as part 
of group of "plea bargainers," that group is defined by one 
particular activity that results from the individual's choices 
and situtation. 
Thus, the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim under 
§1985(3), and should be dismissed, where plaintiff has not 
alleged sufficient facts indicating a conspiracy by the 
defendants, any act in furtherance of such a conspiracy, or any 
racial or class-based animus. Similarly, plaintiff also fails to 
state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986. An indispensible 
prerequisite for a 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claim, under the express 
terms of the statute, is the existence of a conspiracy actionable 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. In light of the Court's finding as to 
plaintiff's §1985(3) claim, dismissal of the § 1986 claim is also 
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a p p r o p r i a t e . See Wacar v . Hasenk rug . 486 ? . Supp . 47 , 51 (D. 
Mont . 1 9 8 0 ) . 
Ill . Immunity from Su-ir 
Absolute Immunity 
Several of the defendants raise absolute immunity as an 
additional basis for dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. In 
the context of claims brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, 
courts have granted absolute immunity to judges, and absolute 
quasi-judicial immunity to those who have comparable functions, 
in order to promote independent decision making free from undue 
influence, to prevent unfounded litigation, and to protect 
against -disabling threats. Seg Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 
800 (1982); Butz v. Economou. 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Imfrler v, 
Pachtman. 424 U.S. 409 (1976); Pierson v. Ray. 386 U.S. 547 
(1967) . 
In addressing the defendants' arguments, the Court divides 
the defendants into two groups, based on the nature of their 
function, in order to determine the applicability of the type of 
immunity claimed. The first group consists of Utah State Court 
Judges Cornaby, Rigtrup, Sawaya, Tibbs, Murphy and Wahlquisc and 
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United States District Court Judge Sam, who all claim absolute 
judicial immunity from suit. The second group, claiming absolute 
quasi-judicial immunity, consists of unon-judicial" defendants 
Namba, prosecutor; Valeika, AP&P investigator; and Haun and 
Sibbett, parole board members. 
"[J]udicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from 
an ultimate assessment of damages." Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 
286, 288 (1991) . "The appropriate inquiry in determining whether 
a particular judge is immune is whether the challenged action was 
'judicial,' and whether at the time the challenged action was 
taken, the judge had subject matter jurisdiction." Van Sickle v. 
Holloway. 791 F.2d 1431, 1435 (10th Cir. 1986). In other words, 
judges are liable only when their actions are taken in a non-
judicial capacity or when they fall completely outside the scope 
of their jurisdiction; however, judges are entitled to absolute 
immunity "even when their action is erroneous, malicious, or in 
excess of their judicial authority." Id.: accord Mireles, 112 
S.Ct. at 288; Piftrson. 386 U.S. at 554. In determining whether 
an act performed by a judge is a "judicial" one, the court must 
decide whether the act "is a function normally performed by a 
25 
judge/' examining the "xnature' and * function' of the act, [and] 
not the *act itself.'" Mirel^s. 112 S.Ct. at 288 (quoting stur? 
v. Soarkman. 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978)). 
Additionally, in applying the doctrine of judicial immunity 
to civil rights claims, no distinctions have been made between 
state and federal judges. Van Sickle. 791 F.2d at 1435. In Van 
Sickle, the Tenth Circuit examined the issue of judicial immunity 
for both state and federal judges who had been involved in 
hearing and deciding Van Sickle's underlying actions. The court 
determined that: 
Whether the allegations with respect to these 
defendants are considered under a Bivens type 
of constitutional tort theory, [citation 
omitted], or the allegations of a conspiracy 
are considered a violation of 42 U.S.C. 
§1985, the federal judges in this case are 
absolutely immune from liability. [Footnote 
omitted.] In Economou. [citation omitted], 
the Supreme Court stated that it is 
'untenable to draw a distinction for purposes 
of immunity law between suits brought against 
state officials under § 1983 and suits 
brought directly under the Constitution 
against federal officials.' 
Van Sickle. 791 F.2d at 1435. 
In the instant case, the plaintiff's Amended Complaint does 
not contain any allegations that the state and federal judges, 
26 
named as defendants, acted in a non-judicial capacity or outside 
the scope of their jurisdiction. In fact, this case provides the 
classic example for which the doctrine of judicial immunity was 
intended, i.e., to shield judges, such as the defendants in this 
case, from the harassment and intimidation of a disgruntled 
litigant who disagrees with the judicial action taken in his 
numerous underlying cases. Consequently, the doctrine of 
judicial immunity bars the plaintiff's claims against Utah State 
Court Judges Cornaby, Rigtrup, Sawaya, Tibbs, Murphy and 
Wahlquist, and United States District Court Judge Sam. 
Moreover, the doctrine of absolute immunity has been 
extended to non-judicial state actors in limited circumstances. 
Applying a "functional" approach to questions of absolute 
immunity, the Supreme Court has determined that u'[i]mmunity is 
justified and defined by the functions it protects and serves, 
not by the person to whom it attaches.'" Valdez v. City and 
County of Denver. 878 F.2d 1285, 1287 (10th Cir. 1989). 
"Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized not only the 
absolute civil immunity of judges for conduct within their 
judicial domain,. . . but also the %quasi-judicial' civil 
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immunity" of such individuals as prosecutors, witnesses, jurors, 
agency officials, probation officers and parole board members, 
for those acts that are considered "intertwined with the judicial 
process." IsL.; see also Imbler. 424 U.S. at 431 (prosecutor 
absolutely immune from damages under § 1983 for his or her 
actions in initiating a prosecution and presenting the state's 
case); Knoll v. Webster, 838 F.2d 450, 451 (10th Cir. 1988) 
(parole board members have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from 
"damages liability for actions taken in performance of the 
[b]oard's official duties regarding the granting or denying of 
parole"); Tripati v. United States I.N.S.. 784 F.2d 345, 348 
(10th Cir. 1986) (probation officer's preparation of presentence 
report intimately associated with judicial phase of criminal 
process, thereby entitling said officer to absolute immunity), 
cerr. den red:. 484 U.S. 1028 (1988). 
Defendants Namba, Valeika, Haun and Sibbett argue that they 
are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for their 
respective roles as a prosecutor, probation investigator and 
parole board member. The primary allegations in the plaintiff's 
comolaint that concern defendant Namba center on Namba's role as 
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the prosecuting attorney in plaintiff's underlying criminal 
action. Plaintiff alleges that Namba (1) conspired to nullify 
plaintiff's plea bargain; (2) recommended plaintiff's defense 
counsel, Steve Vanderlinden; (3) prepared the June 21, 1988 
affidavit; and (4) drafted the original charge affidavit. It is 
clearly established that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from 
damages liability for any actions associated with the prosecution 
of a defendant in a criminal action, including negotiating a plea 
bargain. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons. 113 S.Ct. 2606, 2615 (1993); 
Imfrler, 424 U.S. at 431; Dicesare v. Stuart. 12 F.3d 973, 977 
(10th Cir. 1993); Hammond v. Bales. 843 F.2d 1320, 1321-22 (10th 
Cir. 1988). In the instant case, the Court finds that defendant 
Namba's actions, as alleged in the complaint, occurred while he 
was acting in his role as an advocate for the state. 
Accordingly, defendant Namba is entitled to absolute immunity 
from liability for those actions. 
Similarly, plaintiff's claims against defendant Valeika are 
based on her actions in exercising her responsibilities as an 
Adult Probation and Parole investigator in preparing the 
plaintiff's presentence report. Probation officers who assist 
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the court in sentencing determinations perform critical roles in 
the judicial process in criminal cases. Tripati. 784 F.2d at 
348. In fact, ux[a] presentence report is prepared exclusively 
at the discretion of and for the benefit of the court.'" Id. 
(quoting United States v. Dingle. 546 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (10th 
Cir. 1976)). Thus, the defendant Valeika is absolutly immune 
from civil liability where her activity in preparing plaintiff's 
presentence report was so intimately associated with the judicial 
process. 
Finally, plaintiff alleges claims against defendants Haun 
and Sibbett for actions taken in their roles as parole board 
members in conducting the plaintiff's parole hearings. Due to 
the wjudicial" nature of parole hearings, the Tenth Circuit held 
in Knoll v. Webster, that members of a parole board have absolute 
immunity "from damages liability for actions taken in performance 
of the [b]oard's official duties regarding the granting or 
denying of parole." 838 F.2d at 451; accord Rns? v, Uppah, 972 
F.2d 300, 303 (10th Cir. 1992). Here, the Court finds that 
defendants Haun and Sibbett are absolutely immune from civil 
liability for their actions as parole board members. 
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Qualified Immunity 
State defendants, assistant attorneys general, Larsen, 
Micklos, Miller, Torgensen and Carlson; court clerk, Ludwig; and 
Department of Corrections officials DeLand, McCotter, Barnes and 
Van Der Veur, argue that, as state officials, they are protected 
from plaintiff's claims by the doctrine of qualified or "good 
faith" immunity. 
The doctrine of qualified or "good faith" immunity was 
established in order to, under certain circumstances, shield 
public officers charged with discretionary functions from the 
liability and burdens associated with trial so as to avoid undue 
interference with their duties. E.g., Beard v. City of 
NorthglPnn. Colo.. 24 F.3d 110, 113 (10th Cir. 1994). Under the 
objective standard for qualified immunity established in Harlow 
v. Fir-gprald. 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Court identified a two-
fold inquiry: 
A public officer will only be held liable for 
his conduct if it can be shown [1] that he 
trenched upon a plaintiff's clearly 
established constitutional or statutory right 
and [2] if a reasonable person in the 
defendant officer's position would have known 
his conduct violated that right. 
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Beard; 24 F.3d at 114; acCQrd Brunina v. Pivlgr. 949 F.2d 352, 
356 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied. 112 S.Ct. 1943 (1992); Salmon 
v, Scfrwarz, 348 F-2d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 1991); Snell v. 
Tunnel1, 920 F.2d 673, 696 (10th Cir. 1990), cert, denied. 449 
U.S. 976 (1991). Whether the defendant is entitled to qualified 
immunity is a "legal, not a factual, issue which must be resolved 
in the first instance by the trial court." Snell. 920 F.2d at 
696. 
Because the doctrine of qualified immunity is designed to 
protect a defendant from both liability and suit, "prior to 
filing an affirmative defense, a defendant can challenge a 
complaint by filing either a motion to dismiss or a motion for 
summary judgment if the plaintiff has failed to come forward with 
facts or allegations that establish that the defendant has 
violated clearly established law." Sawyer v. County of Creek, 
908 F.2d 663, 665 (10th Cir. 1990) (emphasis supplied); accord 
Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers v. Losavio. 847 F.2d 642, 646 
(10th Cir. 1988) . "When the defense of qualified immunity has 
been raised by the defendant, the plaintiff then has the burden 
to show with particularity facts and law establishing the 
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inference that the defendants violated a constitutional right." 
Walter v. Morton. 33 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 1994). Thus, 
Mujnless and until the plaintiff both demonstrates a clearly 
established right and comes forward with the necessary factual 
allegations, the 'governmental official is properly spared the 
burden and expense of proceeding any further."1 Sawyer, 908 F.2d 
at 666 (quoting Powell v. Mikulecky. 891 F.2d 1454, 1457 (10th 
Cir. 1989)); Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers. 847 F.2d at 646. 
In light of this Court's earlier finding concerning the 
deficiencies of the plaintiff's amended complaint, it is evident 
that the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts 
supporting a claim that the defendants violated clearly 
established law. The plaintiff must do more than "simply allege 
abstract violations." Guffey v. Wyatt. 18 F.3d 869, 871 (10th 
Cir. 1994). Additionally, where the plaintiff fails to allege 
sufficient facts to support a claim that the "conduct complained 
of violated the law as presently interpreted, it is unnecessary 
to consider whether the law was clearly established at the time 
such conduct occurred." Snail, 920 F.2d at 696 n.21. 
The Court finds that state defendants, Larsen, Micklos, 
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Miller, Torgensen, Carlson, Ludwig, DeLand, McCctter, Barnes 
and Van Der Veur, are entitled to qualified immunity from suit5 
because the amended complaint is completely void of sufficient 
factual allegations to support a claim that these defendants 
violated clearly established law. 
IV. Other Grounds for Dismissal 
Defendant Edmonds, who acted as plaintiff's appellate 
counsel, argues that he should be dismissed from this action 
because (1) he was not a "state actor," for purposes of § 1983 
liability, and (2) the plaintiff's vague and ccnclusory 
5In Bisbee v. Bey, 39 F.3d 1096 (10th Cir. 1994), the Tenth 
Circuit expressly held that the doctrine of qualified immunity 
applies in the context of both § 1983 and § 1985 claims. The 
rationale adopted by the court was that: 
The justifications for the doctrine of 
qualified immunity enunciated in Harlow are 
equally present in section 1985 claims 
regardless of the added requirement of racial 
or class-based animus. If public officials 
are not allowed to assert qualified immunity 
under section 1985, then suits may divert 
these officials' energies away from their 
public obligations; individuals will be 
deterred from holding public office; and 
officials will be chilled in the exercise of 
their duties. 
Id., at 1102. 
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allegations concerning an alleged conspiracy are insufficient to 
state a cause of action against him. 
It is clearly established that to state a cause of action 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1933, the plaintiff must allege that Edmonds 
violated a constitutional right while acting under color of state 
law
- Ruark v, SQlaRQi 928 F.2d 947, 949 (10th Cir. 1991). A 
lawyer does not act under color of state law when performing his 
or her traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a 
criminal proceeding, or appeal therefrom. &££ Polk County v. 
U2&SQT1, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981); Hunt v. Bennett. 17 F.3d 1263, 
1268 (10th Cir. 1994), cert-. denied, 115 S.Ct. 107 (1994). One 
noted exception to the above-stated rule has been recognized 
where criminal defense attorneys are involved in conspiratorial 
acts with state officials, which results in the deprivation of 
their client's constitutional rights. Tower v. Glover. 467 U.S. 
914, 923 (1984) . This exception does net apply here, where the 
Court has already determined that the plaintiff has inadequately 
pled a conspiracy claim. Plaintiff's claim against defendant 
Edmonds should, therefore, be dismissed. 
Additionally, plaintiff fails to state a claim against 
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defendant Sheffield, who functions as the Executive Director, 
Secretary and Examiner of the Utah Judicial Conduct Commission. 
Unquestionably, the authority and jurisdiction of the Judicial 
Conduct Commission, as conferred by statute, does not extend to 
providing habeas corpus relief to prisoners. See Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-7-27 to 78-7-30. Since the Commission has no authority or 
control over the decision process affecting the plaintiff's 
incarceration, it is inconceivable that defendant Sheffield 
participated in the alleged conspiracy or committed any act 
depriving plaintiff of a constitutional right. Thus, in addition 
to the other grounds for dismissal set forth above, plaintiff's 
claims agai-nst Sheffield should be dismissed because there is no 
affirmative link between the alleged constitutional deprivation 
and any acts of Sheffield in his capacity as a member of the 
Judicial Conduct Commission. Durre v. Dempsey. 869 F.2d 543, 548 
(10th Cir. 1989) ; accord Ruark. 928 F.2d at 950; M ^ Q v, Grubbs, 
841 F.2d 1512, 1527-28 (10th Cir. 1988); Gomm v. DeLand. 729 F. 
Supp. 767, 782 (D. Utah 1990), aff'd. 931 F.2d 62 (10th Cir. 
1991) . 
Similarly, plaintiff also fails to state a cause of action 
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against defendant Ferrero; of the Utah State Bar. Ferrero's role 
in responding to plaintiff's complaints against Assistant 
Attorneys General Larsen, Miller and Carlson in no way connects 
him with the constitutional violations alleged in the complaint. 
Again, plaintiff failed to establish the requisite affirmative 
link between acts of defendant Ferraro and the alleged 
constitutional deprivation; therefore, the claims against Ferrero 
should be dismissed. Duxrs., 869 F.2d at 548; accord Ruark, 928 
F.2d at 950; Meade. 841 F.2d at 1527-28; Gomm. 729 F. Supp. at 
782. 
As to the other grounds for dismissal raised by the 
defendants, i.e., insufficiency of service of process, statute of 
limitations and Eleventh Amendment immunity, this Court has 
determined that in light of the findings set forth above, it is 
unnecessary to address these additional grounds. 
RECOMMENDATION 
Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss defendant Vanderlinden from 
the action due to Mr. Vanderlinden's present incapacity. The 
Court finds that dismissal of plaintiff's amended complaint, 
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pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6), is appropriate as to all of 
the remaining defendants for the following reasons: (1) plaintiff 
does not have a cognizable claim under § 19S3 because plaintiffs 
underlying criminal sentence has not been invalidated; (2) 
plaintiff does not state a cause of action under §§ 1985 or 1986 
because he has not alleged sufficient facts indicating a 
conspiracy by the defendants, any act in furtherance of such a 
conspiracy, or any racial or class-based animus; (3) the state 
and federal court judges named as defendants are entitled to 
absolute judicial immunity; (4) defendants Namba, Valeika, Haun 
and Sibbett are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity; (5) 
the remaining state defendants are entitled to qualified immunity 
because the factual allegations in the amended complaint are 
insufficient to support a claim that these defendants violated 
clearly established law; (6) defendant Edmonds is not a state 
actor for purposes of § 1983 liabilty; and (7) there is no 
affirmative link between the acts of defendant Sheffield, as a 
member of the Judicial Conduct Commission, or defendant Ferrero, 
of the Utah State Bar, and any alleged constitutional 
deprivation. Therefore, 
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IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's amended 
complaint be dismissed without prejudice. Additionally, in light 
of the fact that plaintiff has already been afforded the 
opportunity to remedy the pleading defects in his complaint, 
which he failed to do, this Court also recommends that Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 11 sanctions be imposed should plaintiff seek to file a 
further amended complaint without remedying the pleading defects 
as to the conspiracy claim. 
A copy of the foregoing report and recommendation is being 
mailed to the parties who are hereby notified of their right to 
object to the report and recommendation. The parties are further 
notified that they must file any objections to the report and 
recommendation within ten (10) days after receiving it. Failure 
to file objections to both factual and legal findings may 
constitute a waiver of those objections on subsequent review. 
DATED this U day of February, 1995. 
Samuel Alba 
United States Magistrate Judge 
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